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Abstract
We study gains from trade in multi-dimensional two-sided markets. Specifically, we focus on a
setting with n heterogeneous items, where each item is owned by a different seller i, and there is a
constrained-additive buyer with feasibility constraint F . Multi-dimensional settings in one-sided mar-
kets, e.g. where a seller owns multiple heterogeneous items but also is the mechanism designer, are
well-understood. In addition, single-dimensional settings in two-sided markets, e.g. where a buyer and
seller each seek or own a single item, are also well-understood. Multi-dimensional two-sided markets,
however, encapsulate the major challenges of both lines of work: optimizing the sale of heterogeneous
items, ensuring incentive-compatibility among both sides of the market, and enforcing budget balance.
We present, to the best of our knowledge, the first worst-case approximation guarantee for gains from
trade in a multi-dimensional two-sided market.
Our first result provides an O(log(1/r))-approximation to the first-best gains from trade for a broad
class of downward-closed feasibility constraints (such as matroid, matching, knapsack, or the inter-
section of these). Here r is the minimum probability over all items that a buyer’s value for the item
exceeds the seller’s cost. Our second result removes the dependence on r and provides an uncondi-
tional O(log n)-approximation to the second-best gains from trade. We extend both results for a general
constrained-additive buyer, losing another O(log n)-factor en-route. The first result is achieved using a
fixed posted price mechanism, and the analysis involves a novel application of the prophet inequality or a
new concentration result. Our second result follows from a stitching lemma that allows us to upper bound
the second-best gains from trade by the first-best gains from trade from the “likely to trade” items (items
with trade probability at least 1/n) and the optimal profit from selling the “unlikely to trade” items. We
can obtain an O(log n)-approximation to the first term by invoking our O(log(1/r))-approximation on
the “likely to trade” items. We introduce a generalization of the fixed posted price mechanism—seller
adjusted posted price—to obtain an O(log n)-approximation to the optimal profit for the “unlikely to
trade” items. Unlike fixed posted price mechanisms, not all seller adjusted posted price mechanisms are
incentive-compatible and budget balanced. We develop a new argument based on “allocation coupling”
to show the seller adjusted posted price mechanism used in our approximation is indeed budget balanced
and incentive-compatible.
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†Supported by NSF Award DMS-1903037 and a Columbia Data Science Institute postdoctoral fellowship.
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1 Introduction
Two-sided markets are ubiquitous in today’s economy: take for example the New York Stock Exchange,
online ad exchange platforms (e.g., Googles Doubleclick, Micorosofts AdECN, etc.), crowdsourcing plat-
forms, FCC’s spectrum auctions, or sharing economy platforms such as Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb. Yet mech-
anism design for such two-sided markets, where both the buyer(s) and seller(s) are strategic, is known to
be substantially harder than for one-sided markets, i.e. auctions where the seller designs the mechanism.
The additional challenges stem from the following requirements: (1) now the allocation rule must satisfy
incentive-compatibility for both sides of the market; and (2) the buyer and seller payments must satisfy
budget balance, that is, the mechanism must not run a deficit. The limitations of these constraints are best
illustrated by the seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite [30]. They show that even in the
simplest possible two-sided market—bilateral trade, when one seller is selling a single item to a buyer—no
Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC), individually rational (IR), and budget balanced (BB) mechanism can
achieve the first-best efficiency: the maximum efficiency achievable without any of the constraints above.
The second-best efficiency is the maximum efficiency achievable by any BIC, IR, and BB mechanism.
Despite the additional challenges, significant progress has very recently been made in understanding
single-dimensional two-sided markets [1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 15]. Yet, in reality, many two-sided markets involve
agents with multi-dimensional preferences. For example, a customer searching for a place to stay on Airbnb
typically values a listing based on its location, number of rooms, amenities, reviews, and more. For one-
sided markets, multi-dimensional mechanism design has been the core of algorithmic mechanism design in
the past decade, producing a long list of impressive results. See [13, 17] and the references therein for more
details. Our goal in this paper is to study efficiency maximization in multi-dimensional two-sided markets.
There are two ways to measure efficiency in two-sided markets. One is the standard notion of welfare.
The other is the gains from trade (GFT), which is the welfare of the final allocation minus the total cost
of the sellers. Intuitively, the GFT captures how much more welfare the mechanism brings to the market.
Clearly, the two measures are equivalent if efficiency is maximized. However, approximating the GFT is
much more challenging than the welfare. For example, if the buyers value is 10 and the sellers cost is 9, not
trading the item is a 9/10-approximation to the welfare but a 0-approximation to the GFT. Obviously, any
good approximation to the GFT immediately gives a good approximation to the welfare, but the opposite
direction is rarely true.
Several results show that generalizations of posted price mechanisms can achieve a constant fraction of
the first-best welfare in fairly general multi-dimensional two-sided markets [5, 14, 16, 19]. However, GFT
maxmization in multi-dimensional settings has remained elusive. We present, to the best of our knowledge,
the first worst-case approximation guarantee for GFT in a multi-dimensional two-sided market. We
focus on a setting with n heterogeneous items, where each item is owned by a different seller i, and there
is a constrained-additive buyer with feasibility constraint F . The Airbnb example is a special case of our
setting, where the customer is a unit-demand buyer, and there are n hosts, each listing a property. We further
assume that the prior distributions of the buyer’s valuations and sellers’ costs are public knowledge and
independently drawn; the realized valuations and costs are private.
Recall that in one-sided markets, maximizing revenue for even a single (non-constrained) additive buyer
is far more challenging than for single-dimensional buyers, both optimally and approximately [4, 18, 22,
26, 29]. Maximizing GFT in two-sided markets suffers from this curse of dimensionality as well. As with
revenue, single-dimensional settings can leverage an analog to Myerson’s virtual value theory by using the
optimal dual variables, as shown in [7], but as with revenue, this does not extend to multiple dimensions.
Note also that while Colini-Baldeschi et al. [16] are able to extend an O(1)-approximation to welfare to a
two-sided market with XOS buyers and additive sellers, their mechanism gives no guarantee for GFT.
Our Results: The first main result is a distribution-parameterized approximation to the first-best GFT.
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Result I: There is a fixed posted price mechanism whose GFT is an O( log(1/r)δη )-approximation to the
first-best GFT when the buyer’s feasibility constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable (Definition 3),
and an O(log(n) · log(1/r))-approximation for a general constrained-additive buyer. r is a
distributional parameter: the minimum trade probability over all items. We define the trade
probability of item i as the probability that the buyer’s value for i exceeds the seller’s cost.
The notion of (δ, η)-selectability is introduced by Feldman et al. [21] as a sufficient condition for
prophet-inequality-type online algorithms to exist. Many familiar feasibility constraints such as matroid,
matching, knapsack, and the compositions of each, are known to be (δ, η)-selectable with constant δ and
η [21], so our result provides an O(log(1/r))-approximation for all of these environments. Next we intro-
duce the class of fixed posted price mechanisms.
Fixed Posted Price (FPP): There is a collection of fixed prices
{
(θBi , θ
S
i )
}
i∈[n], where θ
B
i ≥ θSi for each
item i. Let R be the set of sellers that are willing to sell their item at price θSi . The buyer can purchase any
item i in R at price θBi . Trade only occurs when both the buyer and seller agree.
Our result is a generalization of the result by Colini-Baldeschi et al. [15], where they provide the same
approximation using a fixed posted price mechanism for bilateral trade. Importantly, our approximation ratio
has the optimal dependence on r up to a constant factor. Example 1 (adapted from an example by Blumrosen
and Dobzinski [5]) in Appendix A shows that, for any r > 0, there is an instance of our problem with
minimum trade probability r such that no fixed posted price mechanism can achieve more than a clog(1/r) -
fraction of even the second-best GFT for some absolute constant c. In our fixed posted price mechanism, we
allow θBi to be strictly greater than θ
S
i . This is crucial for our analysis, but makes the mechanism only ex-
post weakly budget balanced. We leave it as an interesting open question as to whether our approximation
ratio can be achieved by an ex-post strongly budget balanced fixed posted price mechanism.
When the trade probability of each item is not too low, our first result provides a good approximation
to the first-best GFT using a simple fixed posted price mechanism. However, r could be arbitrarily small
in the worst-case, making our approximation too large to be useful. Is it possible to produce an uncon-
ditional worst-case approximation guarantee? We provide an affirmative answer to this question with an
unconditional O(log n)-approximation to the second-best GFT.
Result II: There is a dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post IR, and BB mechanism
whose GFT is at least Ω( δηlogn)-fraction of the second-best GFT when the buyer’s feasibility
constraintF is (δ, η)-selectable, and at least Ω( 1
log2(n)
)-fraction of the second-best GFT when
the buyer is general constrained-additive.
As we show in Example 1, no fixed posted price mechanism can provide such a guarantee. We develop
two new mechanisms. The first one is a multi-dimensional extension of the “Generalized Buyer Offering
Mechanism” by Brustle et al. [7]. We provide a full description of the mechanism in Section 4.2. The second
mechanism is a generalization of the fixed posted price mechanism that we call the Seller Adjusted Posted
Price Mechanism.
Seller Adjusted Posted Price (SAPP): The sellers report their costs s. The mechanism maps the cost
profile to a collection of posted prices {θi(s)}i∈[n] for the buyer. The buyer can purchase at most one item,
and pays price θi(s) if she buys item i. An item trades if the buyer decides to purchase that item.
The main advantage of using a SAPP mechanism is that it provides the flexibility to set prices based
on the sellers’ costs, which allows a SAPP mechanism to achieve GFT that could be unboundedly higher
than the GFT attainable by even the best fixed posted price mechanism (see Example 2). Example 3 in
Appendix A shows that the class of SAPP mechanisms is necessary to obtain any finite approximation ratio
to the second-best: both the best FPP mechanisms and the “Generalized Buyer Offering Mechanism” [7]
have an unbounded gap compared to the second-best GFT, even in the bilateral trade setting.
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An astute reader may have already realized that the payments to the sellers are not yet defined in the
SAPP mechanism. This is because the allocation rule of a SAPP mechanism is not necessarily monotone
in the sellers’ costs if the mappings {θi(·)}i∈[n] are not chosen carefully. Interestingly, we show that if the
mappings {θi(·)}i∈[n] satisfy a strong type of monotonicity that we call bi-monotonicity (Definition 4), then
the allocation rule is indeed monotone in each seller’s reported cost. Since the sellers are single-dimensional,
we can apply Myerson’s payment identity to design an incentive compatible payment rule. The final property
we need to establish is budget balance, which turns out to be the major technical challenge for us. We provide
more details and intuition about our solution to this challenge in the discussion of the techniques.
In Section 5, we draw a connection between a lower bound to our analysis and one of the major open
problems in single dimensional two-sided markets. We prove a reduction from approximating the first-best
GFT in the unit-demand setting to bounding the gap between first-best and second-best GFT in a related
single-dimensional setting (Theorem 4). If in the latter market, the gap between first-best and second-best
GFT is at most c, then our mechanism is a 2c-approximation to the first-best GFT in the former market.
1.1 Our Approach and Techniques
log(1/r)-Approximation (Section 3): Our starting point is similar to Colini-Baldeschi et al. [15]. We first
argue that the probability space of each item i can be partitioned into theO(log(1/r)) events {Eij}j∈[log(2/r)],
such that in each event Eij , the median of the buyer’s value bi for item i dominates the median of the i-th
seller’s cost si. The first-best GFT is upper bounded by the sum of the contribution to GFT from each of
these events. In bilateral trade, simply setting the posted price at the median of the buyer’s value is sufficient
to obtain 1/2 of the optimal GFT from Eij as shown by McAfee [27]. The log(1/r)-approximation by
Colini-Baldeschi et al. [15] essentially follows from this argument.
To illustrate the added difficulty from multiple items, it suffices to consider a unit-demand buyer. Setting
the posted price on each item to be the median of the buyer’s value does not provide a good approximation,
because the buyer will purchase the item that gives her the highest surplus, which could be very differ-
ent from the item that generates the most GFT. Similar scenarios are not uncommon in multi-dimensional
auction design, and prophet inequalities [23, 24] have been proven to be effective in addressing similar
challenges. The main barrier for applying the prophet inequality to two-sided markets is choosing the ap-
propriate random variable as the reward for the prophet/gambler. It is not obvious how to choose a random
variable such that it will translate to a two-sided market mechanism, and in fact, for some choices, no trans-
lation between the thresholding policy for the gambler and a two-sided market mechanism is possible.1 Our
key insight is to replace event Eij with a related but different event Eij where there is a fixed number θij
such that si and bi are always separated by θij (si ≤ θij ≤ bi). We further show that the GFT contribution
from event Eij is at least half of the GFT contribution from Eij . Importantly, the GFT contributed by item
i in event Eij : (bi − si)+ 2 = (bi − θij)+ · 1[si ≤ θij ] + (θij − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ θij ]. Note that if we replace
Eij with Eij , the LHS can exceed the RHS when θij > bi > si. The decomposition of (bi − si)+ using
θij is critical for us to apply the prophet inequality. We can now choose the reward for the gambler to be
vi = (θij − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ θij ], and the thresholding policy with a threshold T can be implemented with a
posted price mechanism where the price for the buyer is θij and the price for the seller is θij − T .3
When the buyer’s feasibility constraint is general downward-closed, the only known prophet inequalities
are due to Rubinstein [32] and are O(log n)-competitive. Unfortunately, the prophet inequalities in [32] are
highly adaptive, and thus cannot translate into prices for a single buyer. Further, an almost matching lower
1For example, one can choose the GFT from the ith item (bi − si)+ as the reward of the ith round, but no fixed posted price
mechanism corresponds to the policy that only accepts items whose GFT is above a certain threshold. Indeed, no BIC, IR, and BB
mechanism can implement a thresholding policy with threshold 0 due to the impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [30].
2x+ = max{x, 0}.
3A similar fixed posted price mechanism can take care of (bi − θij)+ · 1[si ≤ θij ].
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bound of O(log n/ log logn) is shown by Babaioff et al. [3], precluding much possible improvement for
this approach. Instead, we use a constrained fixed posted price mechanism that forces the buyer to buy at
least h items (at their posted prices) if she wants to buy any; otherwise, she must leave with nothing. We
divide the same variables vi into O(log n) buckets based on their contribution to seller surplus. Within each
bucket k, all variables vi lie in [Lk, 2Lk] for some Lk. We prove a concentration result for the maximum
size of a feasible and affordable set. It guarantees that with constant probability, the buyer will be willing to
purchase at least h items (for an appropriate choice of h), generating sufficient GFT.
Benchmark of the Second-Best GFT (Section 4.1): As our goal is to obtain a benchmark of the second-
best GFT that is unconditional, the benchmark from the previous (distribution-parameterized) result cannot
be used here. We derive a novel benchmark in two steps. Step (i): we create two imaginary one-sided
markets: the super seller auction and the super buyer procurement auction. We show that the second-best
GFT of the two-sided market is upper bounded by the optimal profit from the super seller auction and the
optimal buyer utility from the super buyer procurement auction. Step (ii): we provide an extension of the
marginal mechanism lemma [22, 9] to the optimal profit. We show that the optimal profit for selling all
items in [n] is upper bounded by the first-best GFT from items in T and the optimal profit for selling items
in [n]\T , where T is an arbitrary subset of [n]. Our key insight is to choose T to be the “likely to trade”
items, which are the ones with trade probability at least 1/n, and apply the marginal mechanism lemma.
This partition allows us to use our first result to provide an O(log n)-approximation to first-best GFT of
the “likely to trade” items using a fixed posted price mechanism. Moreover, we prove that the optimal
buyer utility from the super buyer procurement auction is upper bounded by the GFT of an extension of the
“generalized buyer offering mechanism” [7]. Finally, we provide an O(log n)-approximation to the optimal
profit for selling the “unlikely to trade” items using a SAPP mechanism. Note that the approximation
crucially relies on the fact that in expectation only one item can trade among the “unlikely to trade” items.
Budget Balance of Seller Adjusted Posted Price Mechanisms (Section 4.3): As mentioned earlier, we
restrict our attention to bi-monotonic mappings from cost profiles to buyer prices {θi(·)}i∈[n] to guarantee
incentive-compatibility. However, budget balance does not follow from bi-monotonic mappings. We extend
the definition of bi-monotonicity to allocation rules and show that all bi-monotonic allocation rules can be
transformed into a DSIC, IR, and BB SAPP mechanism. In our proof of the budget balance property, we
identify an auxiliary allocation rule q, which may not be implementable by a BB mechanism. We then show
that the allocation rule of our SAPP mechanism is “coupled” with q. In particular, our allocation probability
is always between q/4 and q/2. The upper bound q/2 allows us to upper bound the payment to the seller,
and the lower bound q/4 allows us to lower bound the payment we collect from the buyer. Surprisingly, we
can prove that the upper bound of the payment to the seller is no more than the lower bound of the buyer’s
payment. We suspect this type of allocation coupling argument may also be useful in other problems.
1.2 Related Work
Gains from Trade. The most related work is that on worst-case GFT approximation. Blumrosen and
Mizrahi [6] guarantee an e-approximation to the first-best GFT in the setting of bilateral trade—one buyer,
one seller, one item—when the buyer’s distribution satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition. Brustle
et al. [7] study the more general double auction setting: there are many buyers and sellers, but the goods
are identical, and each buyer and seller is unit-demand or unit-supply respectively. They also allow any
downward-closed feasibility constraints over the buyer-seller pairs that can trade simultaneously. They use
the better of a “seller-offering” or “buyer-offering” mechanism to achieve a 2-approximation to the second-
best GFT, for general buyers’ and sellers’ distributions. Colini-Baldeschi et al. [15] show that a simple
fixed price mechanism obtains an O(1r )-approximation to GFT in the bilateral trade and double auction
settings, but a more careful setting of the fixed price gives an O(log 1r )-approximation for bilateral trade.
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Our setting is the first multi-dimensional setting with a worst-case approximation guarantee, and we match
the O(log 1r )-approximation of [15] while providing an unconditional O(log n)-approximation.
Other lines of work provide (1) asymptotic approximation guarantees in the number of items opti-
mally traded for settings as general as multi-unit buyers and sellers and k types of items [28, 36, 35], (2)
dual asymptotic and worst-case guarantees for double auctions and matching markets [1], and (3) Bulow-
Klemperer-style guarantees of the number of additional buyers (or sellers) needed in double auctions in
order for the GFT of the new setting running a simple mechanism to beat the first-best GFT of the original
setting [2].
Multi-dimensional Revenue. In the setting where one seller owns all of the items, has no cost for the
items, and is the mechanism designer, we know much more. However, it is known that even for selling to
a single additive bidder (e.g. with no feasibility constraints), that posted prices can get at best an O(log n)-
approximation [22, 25]. In order to obtain a constant-factor approximation for an additive buyer, Babaioff
et al. [4] use the better of posted prices and posting a price on the grand bundle, and a variation works
for a single subadditive (which includes constrained-additive) buyer as well [33]. However, in a two-sided
market where items are owned by separate sellers, it is not clear how to implement bundling in an incentive-
compatible way. The mechanisms used to obtain constant-approximations for multiple constrained-additive,
XOS, or subadditive buyers [12, 10] are only more complex.
Welfare in Two-Sided Markets. Colini-Baldeschi et al. [14] consider welfare maximization in the dou-
ble auction setting with matroid feasibility constraints. They generalize sequential posted price mechanisms
(SPMs) to the two-sided market setting, guaranteeing a constant-factor approximation to welfare. The mech-
anism posts prices for each buyer-seller combination (and not only for each item), visiting the buyers and
sellers simultaneously in the given order, and advancing on either side when the price is rejected. Trade
occurs when both sides accept the trade. Follow up work of Colini-Baldeschi et al. [16] generalizes the idea
to the setting where buyers are XOS and sellers are additive. Here, there is a posted price for each item,
but only “high welfare” items are considered. The buyers visit and pick out the bundles they want among
the high welfare items. Then, sellers are given the opportunity to sell their entire bundle of items demanded
by the buyers, but not any subset, and they are skipped with some probability. Like the previous work, this
mechanism is ex-post IR, DSIC, and strongly BB (buyer payments equal seller payments). As only “high
welfare” items are considered, it is possible for their mechanism to not trade any item while the minimum
trade probability r is a constant.
Blumrosen and Dobzinski [5] give an IR, BIC, strongly BB mechanism for bilateral trade that obtains
in expectation a constant-fraction of the optimal welfare. Du¨tting et al. [19] study welfare maximization
in the prior-free setting and present DSIC, IR, and weakly BB (buyer payments exceed seller payments)
mechanisms for double auctions with feasibility constraints on either side.
2 Preliminaries
Two-sided Markets. We focus on two-sided markets between a single buyer and n unit-supply sellers.
Every seller i sells a heterogeneous item. For simplicity we denote the item sold by seller i as item i. Each
seller i has cost si for producing item i, where si is drawn independently from distribution DSi . The buyer
has value bi for every item i where bi is drawn independently from distribution DBi . DSi and DBi are public
knowledge. Let DB = ×ni=1DBi be the distribution of the buyer’s value profile and DS = ×ni=1DSi be the
distribution of the cost profile for all sellers. Let b = (b1, ..., bn) and s = (s1, ..., sn) denote the value (or
cost) profile for the buyer and all sellers. For notational convenience, for every i we denote b−i (or s−i) the
value (or cost) profile for without item i. For every i, Fi, fi (or Gi, gi) denote the cumulative distribution
function and density function of DBi (or DSi ). Throughout the paper we assume that all distributions are
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continuous over their support and thus the inverse cumulative function F−1i and G
−1
i exist.
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Throughout this paper, we assume that the buyer has a constrained-additive valuation over the items,
which implies that the buyer is additive over the items, but is only allowed to take a feasible set of items
with respect to a downward-closed5 constraint F ⊆ 2[n]. Formally, for every b and S ⊆ [n], the buyer’s
value for getting a set of items S is: v(b, S) = maxT∈F ,T⊆S
∑
i∈T bi.
Mechanism and Constraints. Any mechanism in the two-sided market defined above is specified by the
tuple (x, pB, pS) where x is the allocation rule of the mechanism and pB, pS are the payment rules. For
every profile (b, s) and every i, xi(b, s) is the probability that the buyer trades with seller i under profile
(b, s). pB(b, s) is the payment for the buyer and pSi (b, s) is the gains for (or payment to) seller i. All agents
in the market have linear utility functions.6 We call the mechanism ex-ante Strongly Budget Balanced (SBB)
or Weakly Budget Balanced (WBB) if the buyer’s expected payment equals, or is greater than, the sum of
all sellers’ expected gains, respectively, over the randomness of mechanism and the profile of all agents. We
call the mechanism ex-post SBB (or ex-post WBB) if it holds for every agents’ profile. The definition of
incentive compatibility and individual rationality are shown as follows.
• BIC: For every agent, reporting her true value (or cost) maximizes her expected utility over the profile
of other agents.
• DSIC: For every agent, reporting her true value (or cost) maximizes her expected utility, no matter
what other agents report.
• (Bayesian) IR: For every agent, reporting her true value (or cost) derives non-negative utility over the
profile of other agents.
• Ex-post IR: For every agent, reporting her true value (or cost) derives non-negative utility, no matter
what other agents report.
Gains from Trade. We aim to maximize the Gains from Trade (GFT), i.e. the gains of social welfare
induced by the mechanism. Formally, given a mechanism M = (x, pB, pS), the expected GFT of M is
GFT(M) = Eb∼DB ,s∼DS [
∑n
i=1 xi(b, s) · (bi − si)] .
We use SB-GFT to denote the optimal GFT attainable by any BIC, IR, ex-ante WBB mechanism (also
known as the “second-best” mechanism). On the other hand, let FB-GFT denote the maximum possible
gains of social welfare among all feasible allocations (known as the “first-best”). Formally
FB-GFT = Eb∼DB ,s∼DS
[
maxS∈F
∑
i∈S(bi − si)
]
.
In Section 3, the distribution-parameterized approximation uses the parameter r, the minimum probabil-
ity over all items i that the buyer’s value for item i is at least seller i’s cost. Formally, for every item i ∈ [n],
let ri = Prbi∼DBi ,si∼DSi [bi ≥ si] denote the probability that the buyer’s value for item i exceeds seller i’s
cost. Without loss of generality, assume that ri > 0 for all i ∈ [n].7 Let r = mini∈[n] ri > 0.
4Any discrete distribution can be made continuous by replacing each point mass a with a uniform distribution on [a− , a+ ],
for arbitrarily small . Thus our result applies to discrete distributions as well by losing arbitrarily small GFT.
5F ⊆ 2[n] is downward-closed if for every S ∈ F , we have S′ ∈ F ,∀S′ ⊆ S.
6Without loss of generality we can assume that the mechanism will only allow the buyer to trade with a (possibly ran-
domized) set S of sellers where S ∈ F . For any trading set T , let S∗ denote the utility-maximizing feasible subset,
S∗ = argmaxS∈F,S⊆T
∑
i∈S bi. If the buyer trades only with the sellers in S
∗ rather than all those in T , this only increases
the Gains from Trade of the mechanism.
7Otherwise the mechanism should never trade between the buyer and seller i, and equivalently it can remove seller i from the
market. This will not decrease the GFT of the mechanism as bi < si with probability 1.
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3 A Distribution-Parameterized Approximation
In this section, we present an O( log(1/r)δη )-approximation to FB-GFT when the buyer’s feasibility constraint
F is (δ, η)-selectable, and an O(log(n) · log(1r ))-approximation for a general constrained-additive buyer.
In Section 3.1, we show that FB-GFT can be bounded by the sum of four separate terms. In Section 3.2
we show that two of the terms (“buyer surplus”) are relatively easy to bound using fixed posted price (FPP)
mechanisms with the same prices posted on both sides. In Section 3.3, we consider the special case of a
unit-demand buyer and bound the other two terms (“seller surplus”) using FPP mechanisms combined with
the prophet inequality. In Section 3.4, we introduce the concept of selectability [21] and bound the seller
surplus for any selectable feasibility constraint by using a constrained FPP mechanism. In Section 3.5, we
present our result for a general constrained-additive buyer.
3.1 Upper Bound of FB-GFT
For every i, let Fi = 1 − Fi denote the complementary CDF of bi. Let xi and yi be the ri2 -quantile of the
buyer’s and seller’s distribution for item i, respectively. Formally, xi = Fi
−1
( ri2 ), yi = G
−1
i (
ri
2 ). We first
prove that xi ≥ yi.
Lemma 1. For every i ∈ [n], xi ≥ yi.
Proof. Note that for every i ∈ [n], bi < xi ∧ si > xi implies that bi < si. We have
1− ri = Pr
bi∼DBi ,si∼DSi
[bi < si] ≤ Pr
bi,si
[bi < xi ∧ si > xi] = (1− ri
2
) · (1− Pr
si
[si ≤ xi]).
Suppose xi < yi. Then (1 − ri2 ) · (1 − Prsi [si ≤ xi]) ≥ (1 − ri2 )2 > 1 − ri. This is a contradiction.
Thus xi ≥ yi.
In the following upper bound, we will separate the probability space for each item i into 2dlog(2/r)e
events, and then divide the GFT into buyer surplus and seller surplus terms according to the cutoff for each
event. For every b, s, define the feasible set that maximizes the GFT as S∗(b, s) = argmaxS∈F
∑
k∈S(bk −
sk), and break ties arbitrarily. Observe the following upper bound for the first-best GFT:
FB-GFT = E
b,s
[max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
(bi − si)+] ≤ Eb,s [
∑
i(bi − si) · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s)] · 1[bi ≥ si ∧ si < xi]] 1
+ Eb,s [
∑
i(bi − si) · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s)] · 1[bi ≥ si ≥ yi]] 2 ,
where the inequality holds because xi ≥ yi for all i. We first consider term 1 . For every i ∈ [n], j ∈
1, 2, . . . , dlog(2r )e, let θij = Fi
−1
( 1
2j
). Let Eij be the event that Fi
−1
( 1
2j−1 ) ≤ si ≤ Fi
−1
( 1
2j
) ∧ bi ≥
Fi
−1
( 1
2j−1 ). Then we have 1 ≤
dlog( 2
r
)e∑
j=1
Eb,s [
∑
i(bi − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ Eij ]].
As discussed in Section 1.1, in order to bound the benchmark with fixed posted price mechanisms, we
will consider a more restrictive event Eij and show that the GFT contribution from event Eij is at least half
of the GFT contribution from Eij . Both events are depicted in Figure 1.
Lemma 2. For every i, j, let Eij be the event that Fi
−1
( 1
2j−1 ) ≤ si ≤ Fi
−1
( 1
2j
)∧ bi ≥ Fi−1( 12j ). Then the
following inequality holds for every j = 1, . . . , dlog(2/r)e:
Eb,s [
∑
i(bi − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ Eij ]] ≤ 2 · Eb,s
[∑
i(bi − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ Eij ]
]
.
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Figure 1: Events Eij and E′ij used in the upper bound of GFT, and the restricted events Eij and E
′
ij .
Moreover, 1 ≤ 2 ·
dlog(2/r)e∑
j=1
E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{
(bi − θij)+ · 1[si ≤ θij ]
}]
3
+ 2 ·
dlog(2/r)e∑
j=1
E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{
(θij − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ θij ]
}]
4 .
Readers may notice that Pr[Eij ] = 12 · Pr[Eij ]. However, this alone does not prove the first statement
of Lemma 2, since both the indicator 1[Eij ] and the contributed GFT (bi− si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s)] depend on
the realization of bi, si. In Lemma 2 we show that the two random variables are positively correlated with
respect to bi, which allows us to prove the first statement. The second statement follows from the fact that
(bi − si)+ ≤ (bi − θij)+ + (θij − si)+ for every bi, si, and that S∗(b, s) ∈ F for every b, s.
In Lemma 3, we bound term 2 in a similar way. The proof of Lemmas 2 and 3 can be found in
Appendix C.
Lemma 3. For every i ∈ [n] and j = 1, . . . , dlog(2/r)e, let θ′ij = G−1i ( 12j ). Then
2 ≤ 2 ·
dlog(2/r)e∑
j=1
E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{
(bi − θ′ij)+ · 1[si ≤ θ′ij ]
}]
5
+ 2 ·
dlog(2/r)e∑
j=1
E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{
(θ′ij − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ θ′ij ]
}]
6 .
We refer to terms 3 and 5 as buyer surplus, and 4 and 6 as seller surplus. In the rest of this section
we will bound each term separately.
3.2 Bounding Buyer Surplus
We bound terms 3 and 5 using fixed posted price mechanisms. Let GFTFPP denote the optimal GFT
among all fixed posted price mechanisms. Recall that our market is not symmetric: a single multi-dimensional
buyer with a feasibility constraint faces multiple single-dimensional sellers. As a result, bounding buyer sur-
plus is fairly straightforward using fixed price mechanisms that set θSi = θ
B
i = θij (or θ
S
i = θ
B
i = θ
′
ij) for
each term, even for the general constrained-additive buyer.
Lemma 4. For any {pi}i∈[n] ∈ Rn+,
E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{(bi − pi)+ · 1[si ≤ pi]}
]
≤ GFTFPP.
Thus both 3 and 5 are upper bounded by O(log(1r )) · GFTFPP.
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Proof. Consider the fixed posted price mechanismM with θSi = θBi = pi. For every s, let A(s) = {i ∈
[n] | si ≤ pi} be the set of available items. Then the buyer will choose the best set S ⊆ A(s), S ∈ F
that maximizes
∑
i∈S(bi − pi)+ (and not buy any item if bi − pi ≤ 0 for all i). Thus the gains from trade∑
i∈S(bi − si) are at least
∑
i∈S(bi − pi)+ ≥ 0. We have
GFT(M) ≥ E
b,s
[
max
S⊆A(s),S∈F
∑
i∈S
(bi − pi)+
]
= E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{
(bi − pi)+ · 1[si ≤ pi]
}]
.
To bound terms 3 and 5 , just apply the above inequality with pi = θij (or θ′ij).
3.3 Bounding Seller Surplus for a Unit-Demand Buyer
In the remainder of this section, we will bound the seller surplus terms ( 4 and 6 ). As a warm-up, we first
focus on the case where the buyer is unit-demand, i.e. the buyer is only interested in at most one item, when
the prophet inequality suffices for our bound.
Lemma 5. When the buyer is unit-demand, for any {pi}i∈[n] ∈ Rn+, we have
Eb,s [maxi{(pi − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ pi]}] ≤ 2 · GFTFPP.
Hence terms 4 and 6 are both upper-bounded by O(log(1r )) · GFTFPP.
Proof. For every i, let vi = (pi − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ pi] be a random variable that depends on bi and si. Let
v = {vi}i∈[n]. Let Vi be the distribution of vi where bi ∼ DBi , si ∼ DSi , and V = ×ni=1Vi be the distribution
of v. Then the LHS of the inequality in the Lemma statement is equal to Ev∼V [maxi vi].
Consider any threshold ξ > 0. Observe that vi ≥ ξ if and only if bi ≥ pi ∧ pi − si ≥ ξ. Consider the
fixed posted price mechanismM with θBi = pi and θSi = pi − ξ for every i ∈ [n]. Whenever the buyer
purchases some item i, we must have bi ≥ pi (the buyer buys) and si ≤ pi − ξ (the seller sells), and the
contributed GFT satisfies bi − si ≥ pi − si ≥ ξ. In addition, the buyer will purchase some item if and only
if there exists some i such that vi ≥ ξ. Therefore we can apply the prophet inequality [23, 24, 34] with
threshold ξ = 12 · Ev∼V [maxi vi] to ensure that the GFT of mechanismM is at least 12 Ev∼V [maxi vi].
3.4 Bounding Seller Surplus with Selectability
In this subsection we bound terms 4 and 6 for a more general class of constraints F using a variant
of a fixed posted price (FPP) mechanism which we call constrained FPP. In the variant, the mechanism
determines a (randomized) subconstraint F ′ ⊆ F upfront. Then the buyer is only allowed to take a feasible
set in F ′ (among all items that the sellers agree to sell at prices {θSi }i∈[n]) and pays the price θBi for each
item she takes.8 Let GFTCFPP denote the the optimal GFT among all constrained FPP mechanisms.9 Since
all of the posted prices as well as the subconstraint are independent from the agents’ reported profiles, the
mechanism is DSIC and ex-post IR. The mechanism is also ex-post WBB since θBi ≥ θSi for all i ∈ [n].
To present our result, we introduce a concept for downward-closed constraints called (δ, η)-selectability [21].
Feldman et al. introduce (δ, η)-selectability in the study of Online Contention Resolution Schemes (OCRS) [21].
An OCRS is an algorithm defined for the following online selection problem: There is a ground set I , and
the elements are revealed one by one, with item i active with probability xi independent of the other items.
The algorithm is only allowed to accept active elements and has to irrevocably make a decision whether to
8Throughout this paper, we assume for simplicity that the buyer will purchase item i when bi = θBi as long as the bundle
remains feasible after including i. Without this tie-breaking rule, one can simply decrease the posted price for each item by an
arbitrarily small value , and the loss of GFT will be arbitrarily small.
9Note that FPP is a subclass of constrained FPP, and therefore GFTFPP ≤ GFTCFPP.
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accept an element before the next one is revealed. Moreover, the algorithm can only accept a set of elements
subject to a feasibility constraint F . We use the vector x to denote active probabilities for the elements and
R(x) to denote the random set of active elements.
Definition 1 (relaxation). We say that a polytope P ⊆ [0, 1]|I| is a relaxation of PF if it contains the same
{0, 1}-points, i.e., P ∩ {0, 1}|I| = PF ∩ {0, 1}|I|.
Definition 2 (Online Contention Resolution Scheme). An Online Contention Resolution Scheme (OCRS)
for a polytope P ⊆ [0, 1]|I| and feasibility constraint F is an online algorithm that selects a feasible and
active set S ⊆ R(x) and S ∈ F for any x ∈ P . A greedy OCRS pi greedily decides whether or not to select
an element in each iteration: given the vector x ∈ P , it first determines a sub-constraint Fpi,x ⊆ F . When
element i is revealed, it accepts the element if and only if i is active and S ∪ {i} ∈ Fpi,x, where S is the
set of elements accepted so far. In most cases, we choose P to be PF , the convex hull of all characteristic
vectors of feasible sets in F: PF = conv(1S | S ∈ F).
Definition 3 ((δ, η)-selectability [21]). For any δ, η ∈ (0, 1), a greedy OCRS pi for P and F is (δ, η)-
selectable if for every x ∈ δ · P and i ∈ I ,
Pr[S ∪ {i} ∈ Fpi,x,∀S ⊆ R(x), S ∈ Fpi,x] ≥ η.
The probability is taken over the randomness ofR(x) and the subconstraintFpi,x. We slightly abuse notation
and say that F is (δ, η)-selectable if there exists a (δ, η)-selectable greedy OCRS for PF and F .
The following lemma is adapted from [21] and connects (δ, η)-selectability to constrained FPP mech-
anisms. Once again, the OCRS gives us both a GFT guarantee and a mechanism: variables vi correspond
to the bound on seller surplus, buyer item prices are {pi}i∈[n], seller prices are {pi − ξi}i∈[n], and the
subconstraint is suggested by the OCRS.
Lemma 6. Suppose there exists a (δ, η)-selectable greedy OCRS pi for the polytope PF , for some δ, η ∈
(0, 1). Fix any {pi}i∈[n] ∈ Rn+. For every i ∈ [n], let vi = (pi − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ pi]. For any q ∈ PF that
satisfies qi ≤ Prbi,si [bi ≥ pi > si] ∀i, let ξi = pi −G−1i (qi/Pr[bi ≥ pi]).10 We have∑
i Ebi,si [vi · 1[vi ≥ ξi]] ≤ 1δη · GFTCFPP.
Moreover, there exists a choice of q such that
Eb,s
[
maxS∈F
∑
i∈S {(pi − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ pi]}
] ≤∑i Ebi,si [vi · 1[vi ≥ ξi]] ≤ 1δη · GFTCFPP.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let Vi denote the distribution of vi when bi ∼ DBi , si ∼ DSi . Let v = {vi}i∈[n]. Let qˆ be
a scaled-down vector of q such that qˆi = δ · qi for every i ∈ [n] and ξˆi = pi − G−1i (qˆi/Pr[bi ≥ pi]). This
is also well-defined since qˆi < qi ≤ Pr[bi ≥ pi]. As q ∈ PF , then qˆ ∈ δ · PF . Consider the constrained
FPP mechanismM with buyer posted prices {pi}i∈[n], seller posted prices {pi− ξˆi}i∈[n], and subconstraint
Fpi,qˆ ∈ F stated in Definition 3.
Fix any item i ∈ [n]. We say item i as active if vi ≥ ξˆi. Similarly to Section 3.3, vi ≥ ξˆi if and only if
bi ≥ pi ∧ si ≤ pi − ξˆi. That is, i is active if and only if item i is on the market and the buyer can afford it,
which by choice of ξˆi happens independently across all i with probability Prvi [vi ≥ ξˆi] = Prbi,si [pi − si ≥
ξˆi ∧ bi ≥ pi] = qˆi.
10When qi ≤ Prbi,si [bi ≥ pi > si], qi/Pr[bi ≥ pi] ≤ 1. Thus ξi is well-defined.
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Then for any v, the set of active items is R(v) = {j ∈ [n] : vj ≥ ξˆj}. By (δ, η)-selectability
(Definition 3) and the fact that qˆ ∈ δ · PF , we have
Pr
pi,v
[S ∪ {i} ∈ Fpi,qˆ,∀S ⊆ R(v), S ∈ Fpi,qˆ] ≥ η. (1)
Note that for the sets S ∈ Fpi,qˆ that have i ∈ S, then S ∪ {i} ∈ Fpi,qˆ with probability 1. Thus, if
we require S ⊆ R(v)\{i} instead, it can not be that i ∈ S, and so the following LHS occurs with equal
probability, allowing us to rewrite inequality (1) as follows:
Pr
pi,v
[S ∪ {i} ∈ Fpi,qˆ,∀S ⊆ R(v)\{i}, S ∈ Fpi,qˆ] ≥ η. (2)
For any v−i, let Ri(v−i) = {j 6= i : vj ≥ ξˆj}. Then inequality (2) is equivalent to
Pr
pi,v−i
[S ∪ {i} ∈ Fpi,qˆ, ∀S ⊆ Ri(v−i), S ∈ Fpi,qˆ] ≥ η.
Define event Ai = {v−i : S ∪ {i} ∈ Fpi,qˆ,∀S ⊆ Ri(v−i), S ∈ Fpi,qˆ}. We will argue that item i must
be in the buyer’s favorite bundle S∗ when both of the following conditions are satisfied: (i) vi ≥ ξˆi, and
(ii) event Ai happens. Note that in M, the set of items in the market is T = {j : sj ≤ pj − ξˆj}, thus
S∗ = argmaxS⊆T,S∈Fpi,qˆ
∑
j∈S(bj−pj). Suppose by way of contradiction that both conditions are satisfied
but i 6∈ S∗. Clearly, for every j ∈ S∗, we have bj ≥ pj , otherwise removing j from S∗ will give the buyer
greater utility. In addition, we have sj ≤ pj − ξˆj , so S∗ ⊆ R(v). By definition, S∗ must lie in Fpi,qˆ. Since
event Ai occurs, then S∗ ∪ {i} ∈ Fpi,qˆ. As vi ≥ ξˆi, this implies that bi ≥ pi. Thus adding i to S∗ keeps the
set feasible and does not decrease the buyer’s utility
∑
j∈S∗(bj − pj). Thus i ∈ S∗ (see footnote 6). This is
a contradiction.
Note that condition (i) and (ii) are independent. Thus for every bi and si such that bi ≥ pi ∧ si ≤ pi− ξˆi
(or equivalently vi ≥ ξˆi), the expected GFT of item i over b−i, s−i is at least
Pr[Ai] · (bi − si) ≥ η · (pi − si) = η · vi.
Thus
GFT(M) ≥ η ·
∑
i
E
vi∼Vi
[vi · 1[vi ≥ ξˆi]] ≥ δη ·
∑
i
E
vi∼Vi
[vi · 1[vi ≥ ξi]],
where the last inequality is because for every i, we have E[vi|vi ≥ ξˆi] ≥ E[vi|vi ≥ ξi] and Pr[vi ≥
ξˆi] = qˆi = δ · Pr[vi ≥ ξi].
For the second inequality stated in the lemma, note that
E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{
(pi − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ pi]
}]
= E
v
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
vi
]
.
For every v, let Sˆ(v) = argmaxS∈F
∑
i∈S vi, and break ties in favor of the set with smaller size. For every
i, let qi = Prv[i ∈ Sˆ(v)] be the probability that i is in the maximum weight feasible set. We have that
q = {qi}i∈[n] ∈ PF . Also for every i, qi = Prv[i ∈ Sˆ(v)] ≤ Pr[vi > 0] = Pr[bi ≥ pi > si]. Moreover,
E
v
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
vi
]
=
∑
i∈[n]
E
v
[
vi · 1[i ∈ Sˆ(v)]
]
≤
∑
i∈[n]
E
vi∼Vi
[vi · 1[vi ≥ ξi]]
The inequality follows from the fact that for every i, both sides integrate the random variable vi with a
total probability mass qi, while the right hand side integrates vi at the top qi-quantile. 2
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For each j in the summation, choose pi from Lemma 6 to be θij (or θ′ij). Then both terms 4 and 6 are
bounded by log(1/r)δη · GFTCFPP. Theorem 1 then follows directly from Lemmas 2, 3, 4, and 6.
Feldman et al. [21] show that many natural constraints—including matroids, matchings, knapsack, and
their compositions—are (δ, η)-selectable for some constants δ and η. For all of these, Theorem 1 implies
that GFTCFPP is an O(log(1/r))-approximation to FB-GFT. See Appendix C.2 for details.
Theorem 1. Suppose the buyer’s feasibility constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable for some δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Then
FB-GFT ≤ O( log(1/r)δη ) · GFTCFPP.
3.5 General Constrained-Additive Buyer
In this section, we consider the case of a general constrained-additive buyer, and prove an O(log(n) ·
log(1/r))−approximation to FB-GFT using constrained FPP mechanisms. Note that Lemmas 2, 3, and 4
still hold in this setting. It’s sufficient to bound the seller surplus term with GFTCFPP.
Throughout this section, we will use the following variant of FPP mechanisms: Other than posted prices,
the mechanism also determines an integer h > 0 upfront. The buyer can purchase any set of items of size
at least h by paying the posted prices for each item in the set; otherwise, he leaves with nothing. This is a
subclass of constrained FPP, with subconstraint F ′ = {S | S ∈ F ∧ |S| ≥ h} ⊆ F .11
Lemma 7. For any {pi}i∈[n] ∈ Rn+,
A = Eb,s
[
maxT∈F
∑
i∈T {(pi − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ pi]}
] ≤ O(log(n)) · GFTCFPP.
Hence terms 4 and 6 are both upper-bounded by O(log(n) · log(1r )) · GFTCFPP.
For every i ∈ [n], again construct random variables vi = (pi − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ pi]. The main issue here is
that in an FPP mechanism, say with posted prices θBi = θ
S
i = pi, the buyer will pick the maximum weight
feasible set (among all items that sellers are willing to sell) according to weight bi−pi (her utility). However,
it might be far from the set used in the benchmark: the maximum weight feasible set according to weight
pi − si. In the previous section, when the constraint F had selectability, by designing different prices for
both sides and adding a more restrictive constraint, we guaranteed that if both the buyer and seller accept the
posted prices for some item, then the buyer would purchase this item with at least constant probability. For
general downward-closed F , it is unclear how to achieve this property with a constrained FPP mechanism.
For every b, s, let T ∗(b, s) = argmaxT∈F
∑
i∈T vi be the optimal set used in the benchmark. We divide
A into three terms according to the value of vi when i is in this optimal set: vi < A/2n, vi ∈ [A/2n, 2nA]
and vi > 2nA. Denote the three termsAS ,AM ,AL accordingly. Firstly we notice thatAS only contributes
at most a constant fraction of A, as AS = Eb,s
[∑
i vi · 1[i ∈ T ∗(b, s) ∧ vi < A2n ]
]
< Eb,s
[ A
2n · n
]
= A2 .
For AL, in Lemma 9, we first prove that Prbi,si [bi ≥ pi ∧ pi − si ≥ 2nA] ≤ 12n holds for every i. This
implies that in a standard FPP mechanism (where h = 1) with θBi = pi, θ
S
i = (pi − 2nA)+ for all i, the
buyer purchases each item i with probability at least 12 once both the buyer and seller i accept the posted
prices. First, we will need Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. Given any constrained FPP mechanismM with posted prices {θBi }i∈[n], {θSi }i∈[n] and h = 1,
suppose
∑
i Pr[bi ≥ θBi ∧ si ≤ θSi ] ≤ 12 . Then
GFT(M) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
E
bi,si
[
(bi − si) · 1[bi ≥ θBi ∧ si ≤ θSi ]
]
.
Proof. For any item i, the buyer will purchase item i if both of the following events happen:
11If h = 1, the mechanism becomes a standard FPP mechanism without any subconstraint F ′.
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1. bi ≥ θBi and si ≤ θSi ;
2. For all items k 6= i, either sk > θSk or bk < θBk .
By the union bound, the second event happens with probability at least 1 −∑k 6=i Pr[bi ≥ θBi ∧ si ≤
θSi ] ≥ 12 . Since both events are independent, we have
GFT(M) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
E
bi,si
[
(bi − si) · 1[bi ≥ θBi ∧ si ≤ θSi ]
]
.
Lemma 9. AL = Eb,s [
∑
i vi · 1[i ∈ T ∗(b, s) ∧ vi > 2nA]] ≤ 2 · GFTFPP.
Proof. Consider the FPP mechanism with θBi = pi, θ
S
i = (pi − 2nA)+ for all i (and h = 1).
Note that for every i ∈ [n], it must hold that Prbi,si [bi ≥ pi ∧ pi − si ≥ 2nA] ≤ 12n . In fact,
A ≥ E
bi,si
[(pi − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ pi]] ≥ 2nA · Pr
bi,si
[bi ≥ pi ∧ pi − si ≥ 2nA].
Thus by Lemma 8 and the fact that bi − si ≥ pi − si when bi ≥ pi, we have
GFTFPP ≥ 1
2
∑
i
E
bi,si
[(pi − si) · 1[bi ≥ pi ∧ pi − si ≥ 2nA]] ≥ 1
2
· AL.
In Lemma 10 we bound AM , which is the primary challenge for this approximation.
Lemma 10. AM ≤ O(log(n)) · GFTCFPP.
Proof. We further divide the interval [A/2n, 2nA] into O(log(n)) buckets, where in each bucket k, vi falls
in the range [Lk, 2Lk] for some Lk. Formally, for any k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d2 log(n) + 2e}, let Lk = 2k · A4n . We
have
AM ≤
d2 log(n)+2e∑
k=1
E
b,s
[∑
i
vi · 1[i ∈ T ∗(b, s) ∧ Lk ≤ vi ≤ 2Lk]
]
.
In the rest of the proof, we will show that for any k, it holds for some constant c > 0 that
E
b,s
[∑
i
vi · 1[i ∈ T ∗(b, s) ∧ Lk ≤ vi ≤ 2Lk]
]
≤ c · GFTCFPP.
Fix any k. For every i ∈ [n], let t(k)i = vi2Lk · 1[Lk ≤ vi ≤ 2Lk]. This is a random variable in [12 , 1].
Note that all random variables t = {t(k)i }i∈[n] are independent. Let Z(t) = maxT∈F
∑
i∈T t
(k)
i . Then the
contribution to AL from values in this range is bounded by the expectation of the random variable Z(t):
E
b,s
[∑
i
vi · 1[i ∈ T ∗(b, s) ∧ Lk ≤ vi ≤ 2Lk]
]
≤ E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
vi · 1[Lk ≤ vi ≤ 2Lk]
]
= 2Lk E
t
[Z(t)].
Now consider the constrained FPP mechanism with θBi = pi and θ
S
i = (pi − Lk)+ for every i (the
threshold h is determined later). Then in the mechanism, whenever the buyer purchases an item, the con-
tributed GFT is at least Lk. Thus it’s sufficient to show that the expected size of the purchasing set is at
least a constant factor of E[Z(t)]. Note that Z(t) is a random variable on t, which is the maximum weight
feasible set over n independent random variables in [0, 1]. In Lemma 11, we prove that Z(t) concentrates
near its mean. The proof is postponed to Section 3.5.1.
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Lemma 11. For any c ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
t
[Z(t) ≥ c · E[Z(t)]] ≥ (1− c)
2
1 + 1/(2 · E[Z(t)]) .
We first suppose that E[Z(t)] ≥ 14 . By applying Lemma 11 with c = 12 , we get
Pr
t
[
Z(t) ≥ E[Z(t)]
2
]
≥ 1
12
.
Let h = max
{
bE[Z(t)]2 c, 1
}
. In mechanismMk, note that for every i, t(k)i > 0 implies that item i is on
the market and that the buyer can afford it. With probability at least 112 , Z(t) ≥ h, which implies that the
item set {i | i ∈ argmaxS∈F
∑
i∈S t
(k)
i ∧ t(k)i > 0} is a feasible set of size at least h. (Recall that all t(k)i
are in [12 , 1]). In this scenario, the buyer will purchase a set of items of size at least h. For every item i she
purchases, the contributed GFT is bi − si ≥ θBi − θSi = Lk. Thus, GFT(Mk) ≥ 112 · h · Lk. Readers who
are familiar with mechanism design may notice that the role of the size threshold h is similar to an “entry
fee” in the posted price mechanism in auctions [4, 8, 10, 12, 33, 37], though the buyer doesn’t have to pay
extra money to attend the auction. It guarantees that the buyer will purchase at least h items when she can
afford it, as otherwise she gets no utility.
When E[Z(t)] ≥ 14 , we have h ≥ E[Z(t)]4 . Thus
E
b,s
[∑
i
vi · 1[i ∈ T ∗(b, s) ∧ Lk ≤ vi ≤ 2Lk]
]
≤ 96 · GFTCFPP.
Now we consider the case where E[Z(t)] < 14 . For every i, let qi = Pr[t
(k)
i > 0] = Prbi,si [bi ≥
pi ∧ pi − si ∈ [Lk, 2Lk]]. Then it holds that
Pr[∀i, t(k)i = 0] =
n∏
i=1
(1− qi) > 1
2
.
This is because if there exists i such that t(k)i > 0, then Z(t) = maxT∈F
∑
i∈T t
(k)
i ≥ 12 as t
(k)
i ∈ [12 , 1] for
every i. Thus if Pr[∀i, t(k)i = 0] ≤ 12 , then E[Z(t)] ≥ 14 , which leads to a contradiction.
Consider the constrained FPP mechanismM with θBi = pi, θSi = (pi − Lk)+, and h = 1. For every i,
define event Ei = {t | t(k)i > 0 ∧ t(k)j = 0, ∀j 6= i}. Note that t(k)i > 0 implies that seller i accepts price
θSi and also the buyer can afford item i. Under event Ei, there is at least one item on the market that the
buyer can afford, i.e. item i. Thus the buyer must purchase some item j on the market that she can afford
(possibly item i). For this item j, we have bj ≥ θBj and sj ≤ θSj . Thus the contributed GFT is at least
bj − sj ≥ pj − sj ≥ Lk. Since all Eis are disjoint events, we have
GFT(M) ≥
∑
i
Pr[Ei] · Lk = Lk ·
∑
i
qi ·
∏
j 6=i
(1− qj) ≥ Lk ·
∑
i
qi ·
∏
j
(1− qj) > 1
2
Lk ·
∑
i
qi,
where the equality uses the fact that all t(k)i s are independent. On the other hand, since t
(k)
i ≤ 1 for any i,
E[Z(t)] ≤ E
[∑
i
t
(k)
i · 1[t(k)i > 0]
]
≤
∑
i
qi.
Thus
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E
b,s
[∑
i
vi · 1[i ∈ T ∗(b, s) ∧ Lk ≤ vi ≤ 2Lk]
]
≤ 2Lk · E[Z(t)] ≤ 4 · GFTCFPP.
Summing the inequality over all k finishes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 7: By Lemmas 9, 10, and the fact that AS ≤ A2 , we have that
A ≤ 2(AM +AL) ≤ O(log(n)) · GFTCFPP.
2
Theorem 2 summarizes our result for a general constrained-additive buyer. It directly follows from
Lemmas 2, 3, 4, and 7.
Theorem 2. For any downward-closed constraint F , FB-GFT ≤ O(log(n) · log(1r )) · GFTCFPP.
3.5.1 Proof of Lemma 11
We recall the statement of Lemma 11: For any c ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
t
[Z(t) ≥ c · E[Z(t)]] ≥ (1− c)
2
1 + 1/(2 · E[Z(t)]) .
Recall that Z(t) = maxT∈F
∑
i∈T t
(k)
i . In the proof we will omit the superscript k as it is fixed. The
random seed t is also omitted if clear from context.
Lemma 12. (Paley-Zygmund Inequality [31]) For any random variable Z ≥ 0 with finite variance, for any
c ∈ [0, 1],
Pr[Z ≥ c · E[Z]] ≥ (1− c)2 · E[Z]
2
V ar[Z] + E[Z]2
.
To use Lemma 12, we only need to show a upper bound on V ar[Z(t)].
Lemma 13. V ar[Z(t)] ≤ 12 · E[Z(t)].
Proof. By the Efron-Stein Inequality [20],
V ar[Z(t)] ≤ 1
2
∑
i
E
ti,t′i,t−i
[(Z(ti, t−i)− Z(t′i, t−i))2] =
1
2
∑
i
V ar[Z(t)|t−i].
Here t′i shares the same distribution with ti (a fresh sample). Note that for every fixed t−i, V arti [Z(ti, t−i)] ≤
Eti [(Z(ti, t−i)− a)2] for any constant a ∈ R. For every i, let Zi(t−i) = maxT∈F ,i 6=T
∑
j∈T tj , which only
depends on t−i. We have
V ar[Z(t)] ≤ 1
2
∑
i
V ar[Z(t)|t−i] ≤ 1
2
∑
i
E[(Z(t)− Zi(t−i))2] ≤ 1
2
∑
i
E[Z(t)− Zi(t−i)],
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Zi(t−i) ≤ Z(t) ≤ Zi(t−i) + 1, as every random variable
tj ∈ [12 , 1].
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Now fix any t. Let T ∗ = argmaxT∈F
∑
j∈T tj . Then for every i, by the definition ofZi,
∑
j∈T ∗\{i} tj ≤
Zi(t−i). Thus ∑
i
Zi(t−i) ≥
∑
i
∑
j∈T ∗\{i}
tj = (n− 1) ·
∑
j∈T ∗
tj = (n− 1) · Z(t).
Hence,
V ar[Z(t)] ≤ 1
2
∑
i
E[Z(t)− Zi(t−i)] ≤ 1
2
E[Z(t)].
4 An Unconditional Approximation for a Single Constrained-Additive Buyer
In this section, we prove Theorem 3, an unconditional O(log n)-approximation when the buyer’s feasibility
constraint is selectable, and an unconditional O(log2(n))-approximation for a general constrained-additive
buyer—without dependence on distributional parameters. The result combines the log(1/r)-approximation
and a novel mechanism—the seller adjusted posted price mechanism.
Theorem 3. Suppose the buyer’s feasibility constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable for some δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Then
there exists a DSIC, ex-post IR, ex-ante WBB mechanism M such that SB-GFT ≤ O( lognδ·η ) · GFT(M).
Moreover, for a general constrained-additive buyer, there exists a DSIC, ex-post IR, ex-ante WBB mechanism
M such that SB-GFT ≤ O(log2(n)) · GFT(M).
4.1 An Upper Bound of the Second-Best GFT
Formally, we use SB-GFT to denote the optimal GFT attainable by any BIC, IR, ex-ante WBB mechanism.
Notice that the GFT of any two-sided market mechanism can be broken down into the buyer’s expected
utility of this mechanism, plus the sum of all sellers’ expected utilities (or profit), plus the difference be-
tween buyer’s and sellers’ expected payment. We show that the SB-GFT is upper bounded by the sum
of the designers’ utilities in two related one-sided markets: the super seller auction and the super buyer
procurement auction.
Super Seller Auction. Consider a one-sided market, where the designer is the super seller who owns all
the items, replacing all the original sellers. The buyer is the same as in our two-sided market setting. The
super seller designs a mechanism to sell the items to the buyer. The main difference between the super seller
auction and the original two-sided market is that the mechanism only needs to be BIC and IR for the buyer,
but with no incentive compatibility constraints for the super seller. We use OPT-S to denote the maximum
profit (revenue minus her cost) achievable by any BIC and IR mechanism in the super seller auction.
To avoid ambiguity in further proofs, for every subset T ⊆ [n] and downward-closed feasibility con-
straint J with respect to T , we let OPT-S(T,J ) denote the optimal profit in the following super seller
auction: the super seller owns the set of items in T and has cost si ∼ DSi for every item i ∈ T . The
buyer has value bi ∼ DBi for every item i ∈ T and is additive subject to constraint J . We slightly abuse
notation and write OPT-S(T,ADD) if the buyer is additive (J = 2T ) and OPT-S(T,UD) if the buyer is
unit-demand (J = {{i} : i ∈ T}). Clearly, OPT-S = OPT-S([n],F).
Super Buyer Procurement Auction. Similarly, let the super buyer procurement auction be the one-sided
market where the super buyer (same as the real buyer) designs the mechanism to procure items from the
sellers. Here the mechanism only needs to be BIC and IR for all of the sellers, but not the buyer. We use
OPT-B to denote the maximum utility (value minus payment) of the super buyer attainable by any BIC and
IR mechanism in the super buyer procurement auction.
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First, we extend the upper bound of Brustle et al. [7] to our multi-dimensional setting,
SB-GFT ≤ OPT-B + OPT-S (Lemma 28)
and then, we prove an analog of the “Marginal Mechanism Lemma” [9, 22] for the optimal profit (Lemma 29).
The proofs of both extensions appear in Appendix D. We partition the items into the set of “likely to trade”
items, that is, items with trade probability ri = Prbi,si [bi ≥ si] ≥ 1/n, and the “unlikely to trade” items.
We can bound OPT-S by the first-best GFT of the “likely to trade” items and the optimal profit of the super
seller auction with the “unlikely to trade” items, and then use this to to decompose OPT-S further, giving
SB-GFT ≤ OPT-B + OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) + FB-GFT(H,F∣∣
H
) (Lemma 30)
≤ OPT-B + OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) +O
(
log n
δ · η
)
· GFTCFPP. (Theorem 1)
Of course, we can Theorem 2 to instead use an O
(
log2(n)
)
-factor for a general constrained-additive
buyer. It is well known that in multi-item auctions, the revenue of selling the items separately is a O(log n)-
approximation to the optimal revenue when there is a single additive buyer [25]. Cai and Zhao [11] provide
an extension of thisO(log n)-approximation to profit maximization. We build on this in Section 4.4 to upper
bound the OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) term, where with |L| items, we get a log(|L|) factor (Lemma 20).
All together, this gives the following upper bound on the second-best GFT.
Lemma 14 (Upper Bound on Second-Best GFT). Define H = {i ∈ [n] : ri ≥ 1n} and L = [n]\H = {i ∈
[n] : ri <
1
n}. Suppose the buyer’s feasibility constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable for some δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Then
SB-GFT ≤ OPT-B +O
(
log(|L|) ·
∑
i∈L
E
bi,si
[
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+
])
+O
(
log n
δ · η
)
· GFTCFPP.
For a general constrained-additive buyer, the O
(
logn
δ·η
)
factor above becomes O
(
log2(n)
)
.
Next, Section 4.2 gives details on constructing a mechanism for a two-sided market whose GFT is at least
OPT-B. In Section 4.3, we show how to use a generalization of posted price mechanisms to approximate
the second term in the upper bound by the GFT of the Seller Adjusted Posted Price mechanism. The
approximation heavily relies on the fact that in expectation, only one item can trade, so it is crucial that L
only contains the “unlikely to trade” items.
4.2 Bounding the Optimal Buyer Utility in the Super Buyer Procurement Auction
In this section, we construct a two-sided market to bound OPT-B for any constrained additive buyer.
Lemma 15. Consider the mechanismM∗ = (x, pB, pS) where for every item i, buyer profile b, and seller
profile s,
xi(b, s) = 1[bi − τ˜i(si) ≥ 0 ∧ i ∈ argmaxS∈F
∑
i∈S
(bi − τ˜i(si))+].
Here τ˜i(si) is Myerson’s ironed virtual value function12 for seller i’s distribution DSi . For every seller
i, since τ˜i(si) is non-decreasing in si, xi(b, s) is non-increasing in si. Define pSi (b, s) as the threshold
12The seller’s unironed virtual value function is τi(si) = si + Gi(si)gi(si) .
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payment for seller i, i.e., the largest cost si such that xi(b, si, s−i) = 1. Define the buyer’s payment
pB(b, s) =
∑
i xi(b, s) · τ˜i(si).M∗ is DSIC, ex-post IR, ex-ante SBB 13 and
GFT(M∗) ≥ OPT-B = E
b,s
[max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
(bi − τ˜j(sj))+].
Proof. Since the seller’s allocation rule is monotone and we use the threshold payment, M∗ is DSIC and
ex-post IR for each seller.
Note that for any seller profile s, when the buyer’s has true type b, her expected utility by reporting
b′ is
∑
i xi(b
′, s) · (bi − τ˜i(si)). According to the definition of x, the buyer’s utility is maximized when
b′ = b. Hence, M is DSIC for the buyer. Moreover we have ex-post IR, as the buyer’s expected utility
when reporting truthfully is maxS∈F
∑
i∈S(bi − τ˜i(si))+ ≥ 0.
It only remains to prove that the mechanism is ex-ante SBB and to lower bound its GFT. By Myerson’s
lemma14 (Lemma 25), for every b we have
E
s
[∑
i
pSi (b, s)
]
= E
s
[∑
i
xi(b, s) · τ˜i(si)
]
= E
s
[pB(b, s)].
Thus the mechanism is ex-ante SBB.
Why is OPT-B = Eb,s[maxS∈F
∑
i∈S(bi − τ˜j(sj))+]? Notice that only the sellers are strategic in a
super buyer procurement auction, and their types are all single-dimensional. One can apply the standard
Myersonian analysis to the super buyer procurement auction and show that the optimal buyer utility is
exactly Eb,s[maxS∈F
∑
i∈S(bi − τ˜j(sj))+].
Note that the buyer’s expected utility inM∗ is exactly OPT-B. AsM∗ is an ex-ante SBB mechanism,
the expected GFT ofM∗ is equal to the buyer’s expected utility plus the sum of all seller’s expected utility,
and the latter is non-negative sinceM∗ is ex-post IR for every seller.
4.3 The Seller Adjusted Posted Price Mechanism
In this section, we introduce a new mechanism—the Seller Adjusted Posted Price (SAPP) Mechanism.
We define an adjusted price mechanism to first elicit each seller’s cost si, and then produce posted prices
{θi(s)}i∈[n] as a function of the reported profile s; thus the mechanism is a collection of posted prices de-
pending on the reported seller cost profile. The items are offered to the buyer at each posted price θi(s),
but the buyer can only purchase at most one item by paying its posted price. See Mechanism 1 for a com-
plete description of the SAPP mechanism. We show that for a properly selected mapping {θi(·)}i∈[n], the
SAPP mechanism is DSIC, ex-post IR, and ex-ante WBB. Moreover, its GFT is at least Θ
(∑
i∈L Ebi,si [(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+]
)
.
Since the posted prices depend on the reported seller cost profile, we need to be careful so that there
is no incentive for any seller to misreport the cost. We identify a sufficient condition of the posted prices,
called bi-monotonicity, to make sure the corresponding mechanism is DSIC and ex-post IR.
Definition 4 (Bi-monotonic Prices). We say the posted prices {θi(s)}i∈[n] are bi-monotonic, if (i) θi(s) ≥ si
for all seller profile s and seller i; (ii) θi(s) is non-decreasing in si and non-increasing in sj for all j 6= i.
In Lemma 16, we prove that bi-monotonic posted prices induce a monotone allocation rule for every
seller, enabling threshold payments [29, 30]. Formally, for every seller i let xˆi(b, s) denote the probability
13One can make the mechanism IR and ex-post SBB by defining pB(b, s) =
∑
i p
S
i (b, s). The mechanism is still DSIC for all
sellers. But it’s only BIC for the buyer, as the seller’s gains equals to the virtual welfare only when taking expectation over sellers’
profile.
14This lemma is used several times, and is formally stated as Lemma 25 in Appendix B.
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that the buyer trades with seller i under profile (b, s). This is either 0 or 1 since all θi(s)s are fixed value
when s is fixed. If xˆi(b, s) = 1, pSi (b, s) is defined as the maximum value s′i such that xˆi(b, s′i, s−i) = 1.
Otherwise pSi (b, s) = 0. It makes the SAPP mechanism DSIC and ex-post IR.
Lemma 16. LetM be a SAPP mechanism with bi-monotonic posted prices {θi(s)}i∈[n]. Then the alloca-
tion of the mechanism xˆi(b, s) is non-increasing in si for all sellers i, andM is DSIC and ex-post IR for the
buyer and the sellers.
Proof. Notice that for every type b, the buyer chooses the item that maximizes bi − θi(s) (and does not
choose any item if she cannot afford any of the items). For every i, by bi-monotonicity, when si decreases,
bi − θi(s) does not decrease while bj − θj(s) does not increase for all j 6= i. Thus if the buyer chooses
item i under the original si, she must continue to choose item i for smaller reports s′i. Thus xˆi(b, s) is non-
increasing in si. Since every seller receives threshold payment, she is DSIC and ex-post IR. As the buyer
simply faces a posted price mechanism, the mechanism is DSIC and ex-post IR for the buyer.
Mechanism 1 Seller Adjusted Posted Price Mechanism
Require: ∀i ∈ [n], function θi(·) that maps each seller cost profile to a price for item i. Input (b, s).
1: Given the sellers’ reported cost profile s, offer each item i to the buyer at price θi(s).
2: The buyer is allowed to purchase at most one item by paying the corresponding posted price.
3: If no item is picked, then no trade happens and payment is 0 for every agent. Otherwise, if the buyer
chooses item i, she receives item i and pays θi(s). Seller i sells her item and receives threshold payment.
The main challenge we face here is establishing the budget balance condition. Unfortunately, having
bi-monotonic posted prices is not sufficient. Consider the n = 1 case: the posted price p(s) = s is trivially
bi-monotonic. Clearly, the corresponding SAPP mechanism achieves FB-GFT. However, due to the impos-
sibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [30], no BIC, IR, and ex-ante WBB mechanism can guarantee
to always achieve FB-GFT, so the SAPP mechanism must sometimes violate the budget balance constraint.
In Lemma 17, we show that even though bi-monotonic posted prices do not imply budget balance, there is
indeed a wide range of bi-monotonic posted prices that induce budget balanced SAPP mechanisms. Our
budget balance proof heavily relies on an allocation coupling argument (Lemma 18) that simultaneously
provides a lower bound on the buyer’s payment, as well as an upper bound on the payment to the seller.
Lemma 17. Let x = {xi(b, s)}i∈[n] be an arbitrary allocation rule that satisfies that (i) the buyer never
purchases more than 1 item in expectation under each profile (b, s), i.e.,
∑
i∈[n] xi(b, s) ≤ 1, and (ii) for
every buyer type b and seller i, xi(b, s) is non-increasing in si, and non-decreasing in sj for all j 6= i.
We define qi(s) = Eb[xi(b, s) · 1[ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ si]], where ϕ˜i(bi) is Myerson’s ironed virtual value for DBi , and
θi(s) = F−1i (1− qi(s)2 ). The posted prices {θi(s)}i∈[n] are bi-monotonic, and the corresponding SAPP mech-
anismM is DSIC, ex-post IR, and ex-ante WBB. Moreover, GFT(M) ≥ 14 Eb,s [
∑
i(ϕ˜i(bi)− si) · xi(b, s)].
Proof. It is not hard to verify that {θi(s) = F−1i (1− qi(s)2 )}i∈[n] is bi-monotonic. Now we proceed to prove
that the SAPP mechanismM is ex-ante WBB. We require the following lemma.
Lemma 18. For every seller i and every seller profile s, xˆi(s) ∈
[
qi(s)+qi(s)2
4 ,
qi(s)
2
]
.
Proof. Note that the buyer will purchase item i if both of the following conditions are satisfied:
1. The buyer can afford item i, i.e., bi ≥ θi(s).
2. The buyer can not afford any other items, i.e., bj < θj(s), ∀j 6= i.
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By choice of θi(s), the first event happens with probability Pr[bi ≥ θi(s)] = qi(s)/2.
Note that
∑
i∈[n] qi(s) ≤ Eb[
∑
i∈[n] xi(b, s)] ≤ 1. For each j 6= i, Pr[bj < θj(s)] = 1 − qj(s)2 . Thus∑
j 6=i
(
1− qj(s)2
)
≥ n− 32 + qi(s)2 . The second event happens with probability∏
j 6=i
(
1− qj(s)
2
)
≥ 1
2
+
qi(s)
2
.
The equality holds when one out of the n− 1 qj(s)’s equals 1− qi(s) and the rest all equal to 0. Notice that
the two events are independent, so we have the upper and lower bound on xˆi(s).
We return to the proof of Lemma 17. For easy reference, we list our notation again:
• x = {xi(b, s)}i∈[n] is an arbitrary allocation.
• xˆi(b, s) is the probability that item i trades inM under profile (b, s).
• xˆi(s) = Eb[xˆi(b, s)] is the probability that item i trades over the draws of buyer valuations, the interim
trade probability.
• qi(s) = Eb[xi(b, s) ·1[ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ si]] is the probability that item i trades in allocation x and the buyer’s
ironed virtual value for item i is above the seller’s cost.
• θi(s) = F−1i (1− qi(s)2 ) is the buyer’s posted price set such that Pr[bi ≥ θi(s)] = qi(s)/2.
Fix any seller profile s. For simplicity, we slightly abuse notation and use xˆi(z) and qi(z) to denote xˆi(z, s−i)
and qi(z, s−i). The expected payment from the buyer under cost profile s is
∑
i∈[n] xˆi(si) · θi(s). For every
seller i, denote pSi (s) = Eb[pSi (b, s)] her expected payment under cost profile s.
Note that for every b, s, the threshold payment pSi (b, s) can be rewritten as the quantity
∫∞
si
xˆi(b, t, s−i)dt+
si · xˆi(b, si, s−i): When xˆi(b, s) = 0, then xˆi(b, t, s−i) for all t ≥ si since xˆi(b, s) is non-increasing in si.
Thus the above quantity is 0; When xˆi(b, s) = 1, let s′i be the maximum value such that xˆi(b, s′i, si) = 1.
Then the above quantity equals to
∫ s′i
si
1dt+ si = s
′
i = p
S
i (b, s). Thus
pSi (s) = Eb [p
S
i (b, s)] =
∫ ∞
si
xˆi(z, s−i)dz + si · xˆi(si, s−i).
We will show that pSi (s) ≤ xˆi(si) · θi(s). By definition,
pSi (s) =
∫ ∞
si
xˆi(z)dz + si · xˆi(si)
=
∫ ∞
si
∫ ∞
0
1[xˆi(z) ≥ t]dtdz + si · xˆi(si) ( xˆi(z) =
∫ ∞
0
1[xˆi(z) ≥ t]dt,∀z )
=
∫ ∞
si
∫ xˆi(si)
0
1[xˆi(z) ≥ t]dtdz + si · xˆi(si) ( 1[xˆi(z) ≥ t] = 0, ∀z ≥ si and t > xˆi(si))
=
∫ xˆi(si)
0
∫ ∞
si
1[xˆi(z) ≥ t]dzdt+ si · xˆi(si).
The last equality is due to Fubini’s Theorem, as the integral is finite due to the monotonicity of xˆi(·).
Moreover, since xˆi(·) is non-increasing, for every z ≤ si, t ≤ xˆi(si), we have xˆi(z) ≥ xˆi(si) ≥ t. Thus∫ xˆi(si)
0
∫ si
0
1[xˆi(z) ≥ t]dzdt =
∫ xˆi(si)
0
∫ si
0
1dzdt = si · xˆi(si).
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Combining the two equations, we have
pSi (s) =
∫ xˆi(si)
0
∫ ∞
0
1[xˆi(z) ≥ t]dzdt
≤
∫ xˆi(si)
0
∫ ∞
0
1[qi(z) ≥ 2t]dzdt (Lemma 18)
≤
∫ xˆi(si)
0
∫ ∞
0
1
[
Pr
bi
[ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ z] ≥ 2t
]
dzdt (Definition of qi(·))
For every t, we prove that
∫∞
0 1 [Prbi [ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ z] ≥ 2t] dz ≤ ϕ˜i(F−1i (1 − 2t + )) for any  > 0. In
fact, let z∗ = ϕ˜i(F−1i (1 − 2t + )). For every z > z∗, Pr[ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ z] ≤ Pr[ϕ˜i(bi) > z∗] = Pr[bi >
F−1i (1− 2t+ )] ≤ 2t− . So 1 [Pr[ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ z] ≥ 2t] = 0 for all z > z∗.
Therefore, for any  > 0, we have the following. We will change variables.
pSi (s) ≤
∫ xˆi(si)
0
ϕ˜i(F
−1
i (1− 2t+ ))dt
=
∫ F−1i (1−2xˆi(si)+)
∞
ϕ˜i(y)d
1 + − Fi(y)
2
(y = F−1i (1− 2t+ ))
= −1
2
∫ F−1i (1−2xˆi(si)+)
∞
ϕ˜i(y)fi(y)dy
=
1
2
∫ ∞
F−1i (1−2xˆi(si)+)
ϕ˜i(y)fi(y)dy
=
1
2
F−1i (1− 2xˆi(si) + ) · [1− Fi(F−1i (1− 2xˆi(si) + ))] (Myerson’s Lemma (25))
= F−1i (1− 2xˆi(si) + ) · (xˆi(si)− /2)
≤ xˆi(si) · F−1i (1− 2xˆi(si) + )
If qi(si) = 0, then xˆi(si) · F−1i (1 − 2xˆi(si) + ) = 0 = xˆi(si) · θi(s). Otherwise, choose  to be any
number in (0, qi(si)
2
4 ). Then, according to Lemma 18 and our choice of ,
1− 2xˆi(si) +  ≤ 1− qi(si)
2
− qi(si)
2
4
< 1− qi(si)
2
.
Hence, F−1i (1 − 2xˆi(si) + ) < θi(s). Thus pSi (s) ≤ xˆi(s) · θi(s) for every i and s, which implies that
Es [
∑
i θi(s) · xˆi(s)] ≥ Es
[∑
i p
S
i (si, s−i)
]
. HenceM is ex-ante WBB.
We remain to lower bound the GFT from mechanismM.
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GFT(M) = E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − si) · xˆi(b, s)
]
≥E
s
[∑
i
(θi(s)− si) · xˆi(s)
]
(xˆi(b, s) = 0 if bi < θi(s))
≥1
2
E
s
[∑
i
(
F−1i
(
1− qi(s)
2
)
− si
)
· qi(s)
2
]
(Definition of θi(s), qi(s) and Lemma 18)
=
1
2
E
b,s
[∑
i
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si) · 1
[
bi ≥ F−1i
(
1− qi(s)
2
)]]
(Myerson’s Lemma (25))
≥1
4
E
b,s
[∑
i
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si) · xi(b, s) · 1[ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ si]]]
]
≥1
4
E
b,s
[∑
i
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si) · xi(b, s)]
]
Here the second-to-last inequality uses the fact that
E
bi
[
ϕ˜i(bi) · 1[bi ≥ F−1i
(
1− qi(s)
2
)]
≥ 1
2
· E
b
[ϕ˜i(bi) · xi(b, s) · 1[ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ si]]]]
holds for every s and i. This is because the right hand side
1
2
· E
b
[ϕ˜i(bi) · xi(b, s) · 1[ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ si]] = E
bi
[
ϕ˜i(bi) · 1
2
E
b−i
[xi(b, s) · 1[ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ si]]
]
can be viewed as the expectation of ϕ˜i(bi) on an event of bi with a total probability mass
E
bi
[
1
2
E
b−i
[xi(b, s) · 1 [ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ si]]
]
=
qi(s)
2
,
while the left hand side is the maximum expectation of ϕ˜i(bi) on any event of bi with total probability mass
qi(s)
2 , as ϕ˜i(bi) is non-decreasing on bi.
Lemma 19 shows how to choose a particular allocation rule x so that the induced SAPP mechanism
(using Lemma 17) has GFT at least Ω
(∑
i∈L Ebi,si [(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+]
)
. Note that the existence of such an
x heavily relies on the fact that in expectation there is only one item that can trade among the “unlikely to
trade” items.
Lemma 19. We let GFTSAPP(S) denote the optimal GFT attainable by any DSIC, ex-post IR, and ex-ante
WBB SAPP mechanisms over items in S for any subset S ⊆ [n]. GFTSAPP(L) ≥ 14e ·
∑
i∈L Ebi,si [(ϕ˜i(bi)−
si)
+].
Proof. Let bL = {bi}i∈L and sL = {si}i∈L. For every i ∈ L, define the event that only i is tradeable:
Ai = {(bL, sL) : bi ≥ si ∧ bj < sj ,∀j ∈ L\{i}} .
We consider the following allocation rule:
xi(bL, sL) =
{
1[ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ si] , if (b, s) ∈ Ai
0 , otherwise
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Notice that (bL, sL) ∈ Ai implies that (bL, s′i, sL\{i}) ∈ Ai for any s′i ≤ si. Thus, xi(bL, sL) is non-
increasing in si. Similarly, it is easy to verify that xi(bL, sL) is non-decreasing in all sj where j ∈ L\{i}.
Furthermore,
∑
i∈L xi(bL, sL) ≤ 1 for all bL, sL. If we choose the posted prices according to Lemma 17,
then the corresponding mechanism has GFT that is at least 14 Eb,s [
∑
i(ϕ˜i(bi)− si) · xi(b, s)].
Moreover, by the definition of xi(b, s),
E
b,s
[∑
i∈L
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si) · xi(b, s)
]
=
∑
i∈L
E
bi,si
[(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+)] ·
∏
j∈L\{i}
Pr
bj ,sj
[bj < sj ]
≥
∑
i∈L
E
bi,si
[(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+)] · (1− 1
n
)|L|
≥1
e
·
∑
i∈L
E
bi,si
[(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+)]
The first inequality is because for each item j ∈ L, Prbj ,sj [bj < sj ] ≥ 1− 1/n. Hence,
GFTSAPP(L) ≥ 1
4e
·
∑
i∈L
E
bi,si
[(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+].
4.4 Bounding the Optimal Profit from the Unlikely to Trade Items
In this section, we provide an upper bound of the optimal super seller profit from items in L. It is well
known that in multi-item auctions the revenue of selling the items separately is a O(log n)-approximation
to the optimal revenue when there is a single additive buyer [25]. Cai and Zhao [11] provide a extension
of this O(log n)-approximation to profit maximization. Combining this approximation with some basic
observations based on the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework [8], we derive the following upper
bound of OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
).
Lemma 20.
OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) ≤ O
(
log(|L|) ·
∑
i∈L
E
bi,si
[
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+
])
.
Here ϕ˜i(bi) is Myerson’s ironed virtual value function15 for the buyer’s distribution for item i, DBi .
To bound OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
), we need the following result from [11]. It provides a benchmark of the
optimal profit using the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework [8]: The profit of any BIC, IR mechanism
is upper bounded by the buyer’s virtual welfare with respect to some virtual value function, minus the sellers’
total cost for the same allocation.
A sketch of the framework is as follows: we first formulate the profit maximization problem as an LP.
Then we lagrangify the BIC and IR constraints to get a partial Lagrangian dual of the LP. Since the buyers
payment is unconstrained in the partial Lagrangian, one can argue that the corresponding dual variables must
form a flow for the benchmark to be finite. By weak duality, any choice of the dual variables/flow derives a
benchmark for the optimal profit. In [11], they also construct a canonical flow and prove that there exists a
BIC and IR mechanism whose profit is within a constant factor times the benchmark w.r.t. the flow for any
single constrained-additive buyer.
15The buyer’s unironed virtual value function is ϕi(bi) = bi − 1−Fi(bi)fi(bi) , and then these are averaged to be made monotonic in
quantile space to create ϕ˜i(bi).
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Lemma 21. [11] For any T ⊆ [n] and feasibility constraint J with respect to T , consider the super seller
auction with item set T and to a J -constrained buyer. Any flow λT induces a finite benchmark for the
optimal profit, that is,
OPT-S(T,J ) ≤ max
x∈PJ
E
b,s
[∑
i∈T
xi(b, s) · (ΦTi (b)− si)
]
where
ΦTi (b) = bi −
1
fi(bi)
∑
b′
λT (b′, b) · (b′i − bi)
can be viewed as buyer i’s virtual value function, and PJ is the set of all feasible allocation rules. More
specifically, λT (b′, b) is the Lagrangian multiplier for the BIC/IR constraint that says when the buyer has
true type b she does not want to misreport b′. The equality sign is achieved when the optimal dual λ∗T is
chosen.
Next, we show that OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) is no more than OPT-S(L,ADD) using Lemma 21.
Lemma 22. OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) ≤ OPT-S(L,ADD).
Proof. Let λˆL be the optimal dual in Lemma 21 when the buyer is additive without any feasibility constraint,
and ΦˆLi (·) be the induced virtual value function. We have that
OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) ≤ max
x∈PF|L
E
b,s
[∑
i∈L
xi(b, s) · (ΦˆLi (b)− si)
]
≤ E
b,s
[∑
i∈L
(ΦˆLi (b)− si)+
]
= max
xi(b,s)∈[0,1]
E
b,s
[∑
i
xi(b, s) · (ΦˆLi (b)− si)
]
= OPT-S(L,ADD).
Cai and Zhao [11] also give a logarithmic upper bound of the optimal profit for a single additive buyer,
using the sum of optimal profit for each individual item.
Lemma 23. [11]
OPT-S(L,ADD) ≤ log(|L|) ·
∑
i∈L
OPT-S({i}) = log(|L|) ·
∑
i∈L
E
bi,si
[(ϕi(bi)− si)+].
Together, Lemmas 22 and 23 conclude the proof of Lemma 20:
OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) ≤ O
(
log(|L|) ·
∑
i∈L
E
bi,si
[
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+
])
.
Proof of Theorem 3: The theorem follows directly from Lemmas 14, 15, 17, and 19. 2
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5 Lower Bounds and the First-Best–Second-Best Gap
In the unconditional approximation results stated in Section 4, we compare the GFT of our mechanism to
SB-GFT. Readers may be interested in whether our mechanism is also an approximation to FB-GFT.
In fact, this question is related to one of the major open problems in two-sided markets: how large is the
gap between the second-best and the first-best GFT? In this section, we consider a unit-demand buyer and
present a reduction from achieving a FB-GFT approximation in our multi-dimensional setting to the open
problem regarding the gap in single-dimensional two-sided markets.
Matching Markets. This setting has a two-sided market with n buyers, sellers, and identical items. Each
seller owns one item and each buyer is interested in buying at most one. Thus the value (or cost) for every
agent is a scalar. Here we consider a special case where for every i ∈ [n], buyer i and seller i can only trade
with each other, and at most one pair of agents in the market can trade. This is bilateral trade when n = 1.
Theorem 4. In the multi-dimensional setting, suppose the buyer is unit-demand. Consider the following
matching market with n buyers and n sellers: for every i ∈ [n], buyer i has value drawn fromDBi and seller
i has cost drawn from DSi . Let FB-GFTSD = Eb,s[maxi(bi − si)] be the first-best GFT of the matching
market defined above (which is the same as FB-GFT in the multi-dimensional unit-demand setting) and
SB-GFTSD be the second-best GFT. For any c > 1, suppose SB-GFTSD ≥ 1/c · FB-GFTSD, then
max{OPT-B,GFTSAPP} ≥ 1
2c
· FB-GFT.
The proof of Theorem 4 is straightforward and can be found in Appendix E; it directly follows from
Lemmas 15, 17, and an upper bound of SB-GFTSD by Brustle et al. [7]. The main takeaway of Theorem 4
is that, if the largest gap between FB-GFTSD and SB-GFTSD is at most (i.e. a constant) c for matching
markets, then our mechanism is a 2c-approximation to FB-GFT. Note that if the buyer is additive, such
a reduction clearly exists: In the additive case, items can be treated separately without impacting the IC
constraint. Then performing a Buyer (or Seller) Offering mechanism16 for every item separately obtains
GFT at least SB-GFTSD [7], thus approximating FB-GFT by the assumption. Theorem 4 shows that for a
unit-demand buyer, a similar reduction also exists using the SAPP mechanism.
On the other hand, finding a lower bound for our result (compared to SB-GFT) is at least as hard as
finding a lower bound for the approximation ratio w.r.t. FB-GFT, and thus is at least as hard as finding
an instance in the matching market that separates FB-GFTSD from SB-GFTSD—a problem that has long
remained open. Indeed, even in bilateral trade, deciding whether the gap is finite or not is still open.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Anna Karlin for helpful discussions in the early stages of the paper.
16In bilateral trade, a Buyer Offering mechanism lets the buyer choose a take-it-or-leave-it price for the seller according to her
value. And in the Seller Offering mechanism, the seller is asked to pick the price for the buyer.
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A Examples
Tight Example of the log
(
1
r
)
-Approximation. Consider the case when n = 1 (bilateral trade). We
introduce an example provided by Blumrosen and Dobzinski [5]. They prove that in this example, no fixed
posted price mechanisms can achieve an approximation ratio better than Ω(log(1/r)) compared to the first-
best GFT. In addition, we will verify that the statement also holds for the second-best GFT for the same
example. It implies that our log(1r )-approximation is tight even compared to the second-best GFT.
Example 1 (Example in Bilateral Trading [5]). For any t > 0, consider a buyer and a seller with values on
the support [0, t]. Let λ = 1
1−e−t . Let F (b) = λ(1 − e−b) with f(b) = λe−b and G(s) = λ(es−t − e−t)
with g(s) = λes−t. Then
r = Pr[b ≥ s] =
∫ t
0
∫ b
0
λe−b · λes−tdsdb = λ2 · e−t(t− 1 + e−t) = t− 1
et − 1 +
t
(et − 1)2
FB-GFT =
∫ t
0
∫ b
0
(b− s)λe−b · λes−tdsdb = λ2 · ( t− 2
et
+
t+ 2
e2t
)
In any fixed posted price mechanism, note that the mechanism always achieves a larger GFT by choosing
the same price for both agents. The gains from trade from posting at price p:
GFT(p) =
∫ p
0
∫ v
p
(b− s)λe−b ·λes−tdbds = λ2( t+ 2
e2t
+
2
et
− p+ 2
ep+t
− e
p(t+ 2− p)
e2t
) < λ2(
t+ 2
e2t
+
2
et
)
When t is sufficiently large, FB-GFT is about λ2 · t−2et while GFT(p) is at most λ2 · 2et , as t+2e2t is
negligible. Thus GFT(p) = O(1/t) · FB-GFT. On the other hand, r = Θ( tet ) for large t, log(1r ) = Θ(t).
Thus GFT(p) = O(1/ log(1r )) · FB-GFT.
We now verify that GFT(p) = O(1/ log(1r )) ·SB-GFT for any p ∈ [0, t] and sufficiently large t. By [7],
SB-GFT ≥ E
b,s
[(b− s) · 1[ϕ˜(b)− s ≥ 0]]
For the above distribution, ϕ(b) = b − 1−F (b)f(b) = b − 1 + eb−t is monotonic increasing in b. Thus
ϕ˜(b) = ϕ(b).
1
λ2
· E
b,s
[(b− s) · 1[ϕ˜(b)− s ≥ 0]] =
∫ t
0
∫ b−1+eb−t
0
(b− s) · es−b−tdsdb
≥
∫ t
0
∫ b−1
0
(b− s) · es−b−tdsdb
= e−t ·
∫ t
0
∫ b
1
k · e−kdkdb (k = b− s)
= e−t ·
∫ t
0
(−e−k(k + 1)∣∣b
1
)ds
= e−t ·
∫ t
0
[
2
e
− e−b(b+ 1)
]
ds
= e−t · (2t
e
+
t+ 2
et
− 2)
Thus when t is sufficiently large, SB-GFT = Ω(λ2 · tet ) and we have GFT(p) = O(1/t) · SB-GFT =
O(1/ log(1r )) · SB-GFT.
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Example 2 (GFTSAPP is unboundedly higher than GFTFPP). For any fixed n, consider the following in-
stance for an additive buyer. DB1 and DS1 are distributions in Example 1 some sufficiently large t. Pick any
C > 0. For every i = 2, ldots, n, DBi is a degenerate distribution at C, i.e. the value is C with probability
1. Distribution DSi takes value C +  with probability 1 − 12n and C with probability 12n , for some small
 > 0. As shown in Example 2, when t is large, r1 = Θ( tet ) <
1
n . For i ≥ 2, ri = 12n . Thus all items are
“unlikely to trade” items (ri < 1n ).
Note that for i ≥ 2, bi is always no more than si. By Lemma 19,
GFTSAPP = Ω
(∑
i
E
bi,si
[(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+]
)
= Ω( E
b1,s1
[(ϕ˜1(b1)− s1)+])
In Example 1, when t is sufficiently large, Eb1,s1 [(ϕ˜1(b1)− s1)+] = Ω(λ2 · tet ). On the other hand, any
fixed price mechanism can only gain positive GFT from item 1. Thus GFTFPP = O(λ2 · 2et ), which can be
arbitrarily far from GFTSAPP as t goes to infinity.
Dependence on r is Necessary. We show that the dependence on r = mini ri is necessary for the ap-
proximation result of fixed posted price mechanisms. More formally, suppose fixed posted price mech-
anisms achieves an approximation ratio of f(r1, . . . , rn), for some n-ary function f . We will show that
f(r1, . . . , rn) = Ω(log(1/r)). Consider the instance shown in Example 2. Clearly FB-GFT = E [(b1 − s1)+].
Since all items other than item 1 always contribute 0 gains from trade, no fixed posted price mechanism can
achieve better than Ω(log(1/r1))-approximation to the first-best. Thus f(r1, . . . , rn) = Ω(log(1/r1)). Sim-
ilarly we have f(r1, . . . , rn) = Ω(log(1/ri)) for all i = 1, . . . , n. Thus f(r1, . . . , rn) = Ω(log(1/r)).
SAPP Mechanism is Necessary. We provide the following example (Example 3) to show that the class
of SAPP mechanisms defined in Mechanism 4.3 is necessary to obtain any finite approximation ratio to
SB-GFT. More specifically, we show that in bilateral trading, the best FPP mechanism and the mechanism
used in Lemma 15 can both be arbitrarily far from SB-GFT.
Example 3. For every positive integer m ≥ 2, consider the bilateral trading instance where the seller’s and
buyer’s (discrete) distributions are shown in the following tables. In the table, g(s) (or f(b)) represents the
density of the corresponding value in the support.
s 0 2m − 2m−1 . . . 2m − 2k . . . 2m − 1
g(s) 12m
1
2m . . .
1
2k+1
. . . 12
τ(s) 0 2m . . . 2m . . . 2m
Table 1: Seller’s Distribution
b 2m − 2L . . . 2m − 2k . . . 2m − 1
f(b) pL . . . pk . . . p0
Table 2: Buyer’s Distribution
For the seller’s distribution, one can verify that the virtual value τ(s) is 0 if s = 0 and 2m elsewhere.17
17For discrete distributions, the virtual value for the seller’s distribution is defined as τ(s) = s +
∑
t<s g(t)·(s−s′)
g(s)
, where s′ is
the largest type in the support that is smaller than s.
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For the buyer’s distribution, choose L = bm− log(m)c. Then define the sequence {pk}Lk=0 as follows:
Construct the sequence {qk}Lk=0 with q0 = 1, q1 = 1m−1 , and for every k = 2, . . . , L, qk = m−k+2m−k · qk−1.
Then for every k = 0, . . . , L define pk = qk/
∑L
j=0 qj for every k.
By induction, we have
∑k
j=0 qj = qk+1 · (m− k − 1). Thus
k∑
j=0
pj = pk+1 · (m− k − 1). (3)
Lemma 24. For any sufficiently large integer m, let M be the mechanism used in Lemma 15.18 Then in
Example 3 we have
max{GFTFPP,GFT(M)} ≤ O( 1
log(m)
) · SB-GFT.
Proof. In mechanism M (see Lemma 15), the buyer only trades with the seller when b ≥ τ(s). Thus in
Example 3, the item trades only when s = 0.
GFT(M) =
L∑
k=0
(2m − 2k) · pk · 1
2m
≤
L∑
k=0
pk.
For FB-GFT, we have
FB-GFT =
L∑
k=0
 m−1∑
j=k+1
(2j − 2k) · pk · 1
2j+1
+
(2m − 2k)pk
2m

≥
L∑
k=0
pk ·
 m−1∑
j=k+1
2j−1
2j+1
+
2m−1
2m
 ≥ 1
4
·
L∑
k=0
pk · (m− k),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that 2j − 2k ≥ 2j−1 for any j > k.
Now consider any fixed posted price mechanism. Clearly the largest GFT is achieved when the posted
prices are same for both the buyer and the seller. Without loss of generality we can assume the posted price
p lies in the support of distributions, i.e., p = 2m − 2k for k = 0, . . . , L. For any k, the mechanism with
posted price p = 2m − 2k achieves GFT
k∑
j=0
(
m−1∑
i=k+1
(2i − 2j) · pj · 1
2i+1
+
(2m − 2j)pj
2m
)
≤
k∑
j=0
pj
(
m−1∑
i=k+1
2i
2i+1
+ 1
)
≤
k∑
j=0
pj · (m− k).
Let Qk =
∑k
j=0 pj · (m− k). Note that by the choice of sequence {pk}Lk=0 in Example 3, we have for
any k = 0, . . . , L− 1 that
Qk+1 −Qk =
k+1∑
j=0
pj · (m− k − 1)−
k∑
j=0
pj · (m− k) = pk+1 · (m− k − 1)−
k∑
j=0
pj = 0.
18In bilateral trading, the mechanism is essentially the Buyer Offering mechanism [7]: The buyer picks a take-it or leave-it price
according to her value and the seller can choose whether to sell at that price.
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Thus each Qk is the same value. Let this value be Q. Then Q = QL =
∑L
j=0 pj · (m − L) = m − L.
Moreover, GFTFPP ≤ maxkQk = Q. GFT(M) ≤
∑L
k=0 pk =
QL
m−L ≤ 1log(m) ·Q. On the other hand,
FB-GFT ≥ 1
4
·
L∑
k=0
pk · (m− k) = 1
4
·
L∑
k=0
k−1∑
j=0
pj (Equation 3)
=
1
4
L∑
k=0
Qk−1
m− k + 1 ≥ Q ·
∫ m+1
m−L+1
1
x
dx =
Q
4
· log
(
m+ 1
m− L+ 1
)
.
When m is sufficiently large, we have FB-GFT ≥ Q5 · log(m). Thus
log(m)
5
·max{GFTFPP,GFT(M)} ≤ FB-GFT.
It remains to verify that SB-GFT is a constant factor of FB-GFT. By [7],
SB-GFT ≥ E
b,s
[(b− s) · 1[ϕ˜(b)− s ≥ 0]].
Now we calculate the buyer’s virtual value.19 We have that ϕ(2m − 1) = 2m − 1, and for every
k = 1, . . . , L,
ϕ(2m − 2k) = (2m − 2k)−
∑k−1
j=0 pj · 2k−1
pk
= 2m − 2k − 2k−1(m− k) ≥ 2m − 2k ·m,
thus ϕ(·) is monotone increasing and ϕ˜(b) = ϕ(b) for every b. Note that when b = 2m − 2k and s ≤
2m − 2k+log(m), it holds that ϕ(b) ≥ s. We have
SB-GFT ≥
L∑
k=0
 m−1∑
j=k+dlog(m)e
(2j − 2k) · pk · 1
2j+1
+
(2m − 2k)pk
2m

= FB-GFT −
L∑
k=0
k+dlog(m)e−1∑
j=k+1
(2j − 2k) · pk · 1
2j+1
≥ FB-GFT −
L∑
k=0
k+dlog(m)e−1∑
j=k+1
pk · 2
j
2j+1
≥ FB-GFT − log(m)
2
L∑
k=0
pk = FB-GFT − log(m)
2
.
Note that FB-GFT ≥ Q5 · log(m) = m−L5 · log(m) ≥ 15 · log2(m). Thus when m→∞, SB-GFTFB-GFT → 1. We
finish the proof.
B Mechanism Design Background
Myerson’s Lemma
For reference, we formally state Myerson’s Lemma.
19For discrete distributions, the buyer’s virtual value is defined as ϕ(b) = b −
∑
t>b f(t)·(b′−b)
f(b)
, where b′ is the smallest type in
the support that is larger than b.
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Lemma 25 (Myerson’s Lemma [29]). In a setting with single-dimensional preferences, where the buyer’s
distribution for item i is DBi and seller i’s distribution is DSi , let the probability of trade for each item be
xˆ = {xˆi(b, s)}i∈[n]. Denote the interim allocation rule for the sellers as xˆi(s) = Eb[xˆi(b, s)]. In order to be
BIC, sellers’ payments must meet the following payment identity:
pSi (s) = si · xˆi(si, s−i) +
∫ ∞
s
xˆi(t, s−i)dt.
Then let τi(si) = si+
Gi(si)
gi(si)
be seller i’s Myerson virtual value, and τ˜i(si) the ironed virtual value, obtained
by averaging the virtual values in quantile space to enforce that τ˜i(·) is monotone non-decreasing in si. Then
expected payment equals expected virtual welfare:
E
s
[∑
i
pSi (b, s)
]
= E
s
[∑
i
xˆi(b, s) · τ˜i(si)
]
.
Further, let ϕi(bi) = bi − 1−Fi(bi)fi(bi) be a single-dimensional buyer’s Myerson virtual value, and ϕ˜i(bi)
the ironed virtual value. Then ∫ ∞
p
ϕ˜i(x)dx = p · [1− Fi(p)].
Similarly, for IC single-dimensional payments pBi (bi), then
E
s
[∑
i
pBi (b, s)
]
= E
s
[∑
i
xˆi(b, s) · ϕ˜i(bi)
]
.
C Missing Details from Section 3
C.1 Missing Proofs from the Upper Bound of FB-GFT in Section 3.1
Proof of Lemma 2:
For every i, s, bi, define
qi(bi, s) = (bi − si)+ · Pr
b−i
[i ∈ S∗(b, s)] · 1
[
Fi
−1
(
1
2j−1
) ≤ si ≤ Fi−1( 1
2j
)
]
.
Then we have that qi(bi, s) ≥ 0 is non-decreasing in bi, as both bi−si and the probability Prb−i [i ∈ S∗(b, s)]
is non-decreasing in bi.
Since θij = Fi
−1
( 1
2j
) and Prbi
[
bi ≥ Fi−1( 12j )
]
= 12 Prbi
[
bi ≥ Fi−1( 12j−1 )
]
, we have
E
bi
[qi(bi, s) · 1 [bi ≥ θij ]] ≥qi(θij , s) · Pr
bi
[bi ≥ θij ]
=qi(θij , s) · Pr
bi
[
Fi
−1
(
1
2j−1
) ≤ bi < θij
]
≥E
bi
[
qi(bi, s) · 1
[
Fi
−1
(
1
2j−1
) ≤ bi < θij
]]
.
(4)
Thus we have
33
E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ Eij ]
]
=
∑
i
E
bi,s
[
qi(bi, s) · 1[bi ≥ Fi−1( 1
2j−1
)]
]
≤2 ·
∑
i
E
bi,s
[qi(bi, s) · 1[bi ≥ θij ]] (Inequality (4))
=2 · E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ Eij ]
]
≤2 · E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − θij)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ Eij ]
]
+ 2 · E
b,s
[∑
i
(θij − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ Eij ]
]
Moreover, we have
E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − θij)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s)] · 1[Eij ]
]
≤ E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − θij)+ · 1[si ≤ θij ] · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s)]
]
≤ E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{
(bi − θij)+ · 1[si ≤ θij ]
}]
(5)
Similarly,
E
b,s
[∑
i
(θij − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ Eij ]
]
≤ E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{
(θij − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ θij ]
}]
2
Proof of Lemma 3: For every i ∈ [n] and j = 1, ..., dlog(2/r)e, let E′ij be the event that G−1i ( 12j ) ≤ bi ≤
G−1i (
1
2j−1 ) ∧ si ≤ G−1i ( 12j−1 ) and E
′
ij be the event that G
−1
i (
1
2j
) ≤ bi ≤ G−1i ( 12j−1 ) ∧ si ≤ G−1i ( 12j ). We
have
2 ≤
dlog( 2
r
)e∑
j=1
Eb,s
[∑
i(bi − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ E′ij ]
]
.
Fix any j. For every i,b, si, define
qi(b, si) = (bi − si)+ · Pr
s−i
[i ∈ S∗(b, s)] · 1
[
G−1i (
1
2j
) ≤ bi ≤ G−1i (
1
2j−1
)
]
.
Then we have that qi(b, si) > 0 is non-increasing in si. Since θ′ij = G
−1
i (
1
2j
) and Prsi
[
si ≤ G−1i ( 12j )
]
=
1
2 Prsi
[
si ≤ G−1i ( 12j−1 )
]
, we have
E
si
[
qi(b, si) · 1
[
si ≤ θ′ij
]] ≥qi(b, θ′ij) · Prsi [si ≤ θ′ij]
=
1
2
qi(b, θ′ij) · Prsi
[
si ≤ G−1i (
1
2j−1
)
]
≥1
2
E
si
[
qi(b, si) · 1
[
si ≤ G−1i (
1
2j−1
)
]]
.
(6)
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Thus we have
E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ E′ij ]
]
=
∑
i
E
b,si
[
qi(b, si) · 1[si ≤ G−1i (
1
2j−1
)]
]
≤2 ·
∑
i
E
b,si
[
qi(b, si) · 1[si ≤ θ′ij ]
]
(Inequality 6)
=2 · E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ E′ij ]
]
≤2 · E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − θ′ij)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ E′ij ]
]
+ 2 · E
b,s
[∑
i
(θ′ij − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ E′ij ]
]
Moreover, we have
E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − θ′ij)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s)] · 1[E′ij ]
]
≤ E
b,s
[∑
i
(bi − θ′ij)+ · 1[si ≤ θ′ij ] · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s)]
]
≤ E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{
(bi − θ′ij)+ · 1[si ≤ θ′ij ]
}]
(7)
Similarly,
E
b,s
[∑
i
(θ′ij − si)+ · 1[i ∈ S∗(b, s) ∧ E′ij ]
]
≤ E
b,s
[
max
S∈F
∑
i∈S
{
(θ′ij − si)+ · 1[bi ≥ θ′ij ]
}]
2
C.2 Applications of Theorem 1 for Natural Constraints
Definition 5 (Matroid Constraint). A matroid is specified by a pair (I,F), where I is a finite ground set and
F ⊆ 2I is a family of subsets of I . (I,F) satisfies all of the following properties:
• ∅ ∈ F .
• F is downward-closed: For every S ∈ F , we have S′ ∈ F , ∀S′ ⊆ S.
• F has exchange property: For every S, S′ ∈ F and |S′| > |S|, there exists e ∈ S′\S such that
S ∪ {e} ∈ F .
In the paper we say F is a matroid constraint with respect to I if (I,F) forms a matroid.
Definition 6 (Matching, Knapsack Constraint). Given an undirected graph G = (V,E). F ⊆ 2E is a
matching constraint with respect to the ground set E if F = {M ⊆ E : M is a matching in G}. A knapsack
constraint F with respect to the ground set I is defined as: F = {S ⊆ I : ∑i∈S ci ≤ 1}. Here ci ∈ [0, 1]
is the weight of element i.
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Feldman et al. [21] prove that matroids, matching constraints and knapsack constraints are all (δ, η)-
selectable for some constant δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, they prove that (δ, η)-selectability has nice compos-
ability.
Lemma 26 (Selectability of Natural Constraints). [21]
• For any matroid constraint F and any δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a (δ, 1− δ)-selectable greedy OCRS for
PF . Moreover, for any  ∈ (0, 1− δ), there exists a (δ, 1− δ − )-selectable greedy OCRS pi for PF ,
and the running time of pi is polynomial on the input size and 1/.
• For any matching constraint F and any δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists an efficient (δ, e−2δ)-selectable greedy
OCRS for PF .
• For any knapsack constraintF and any δ ∈ (0, 12), there exists an efficient (δ, 1−2δ2−2δ )-selectable greedy
OCRS for PF .
Lemma 27 (Composability of Selectability). [21] Given two downward-closed constraints F1 and F2 with
respect to the same ground set I . Let F = F1 ∩ F2. Suppose there exist a (δ, η1)-selectable greedy OCRS
pi1 for P1 and F1, and a (δ, η2)-selectable greedy OCRS pi2 for P2 and F2. Then there exists a (δ, η1 · η2)-
selectable greedy OCRS pi for P1 ∩ P2 and F . When P1 = PF1 and P2 = PF2 , as PF1 ∩ PF2 ⊆ PF , pi is
also (δ, η1 · η2)-selectable for PF and F . Moreover, pi is efficient computable given pi1 and pi2.
Corollary 1. Suppose the buyer’s feasibility constraint is F = ⋂dt=1Ft for some constant d, where each Ft
is a matroid, matching constraint, or knapsack constraint. Then FB-GFT ≤ O(log(1r )) · GFTCFPP.
Proof of Corollary 1: Pick any constant δ ∈ (0, 12). By Lemma 26 and 27, there exists some constant
η ∈ (0, 1) such that there exists an efficient, (δ, η)-selectable greedy OCRS for PF . Then the result follows
from Theorem 1.2
C.3 Computing the Approximately-Optimal Mechanism Efficiently
By Lemma 4, the fixed posted price mechanisms to bound term 3 and 5 are efficiently computable. In
Lemma 6, the buyer posted prices are chosen as pi = θij (or θ′ij), which can be computed efficiently. In order
to find seller posted prices, it’s sufficient to find the optimal q in Lemma 6 that maximizes
∑
i Ebi,si [vi · 1[vi ≥ ξi]].
For every i and qi ≤ Pr[bi ≥ pi > si], let
hi(qi) = E
bi,si
[vi · 1[vi ≥ ξi]] = Pr[bi ≥ pi] ·
∫ pi−ξi
0
(pi − si)dGi(si).
Then it’s equivalent to solve the following maximization problem over the polytope PF :
max
∑
i
hi(qi)
s.t. q ∈ PF
qi ≤ Pr[bi ≥ pi] · Pr[si < pi], ∀i ∈ [n].
Observe that every hi is a concave function. In many settings one can efficiently obtain a near-optimal
solution using convex optimization techniques.
Moreover, the subconstraint F ′ can be efficiently computed if there exists an efficient greedy OCRS for
PF . For the constraints in Corollary 1, by Lemma 26 and 27, the subconstraint can be computed efficiently.
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D Missing Details from Section 4
In this section, we use the notions of the “super seller auction” and “super buyer procurement auction” from
Section 4.1.
We claim that the GFT of any IR, BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanismM = (x, pB, pS) is upper bounded
by OPT-S + OPT-B. The proof is adapted from [7].
Lemma 28. [7] SB-GFT ≤ OPT-S + OPT-B.
Proof. Take any BIC, IR, ex-ante WBB mechanismM = (x, pB, pS). Since every seller i is BIC and IR,
we have for any si, s′i,
E
b,s−i
[
pSi (b, s)− si · xi(b, s)
] ≥ max{ E
b,s−i
[pSi (b, s
′
i, s−i)]− si · xi(b, s′i, s−i), 0
}
Observe that M′ = (x, pS) is a valid super buyer procurement auction. The above inequalities are
exactly the BIC and IR constraints for seller i. ThusM′ is BIC and IR. Similarly,M′′ = (x, pB) is BIC
and IR, so it is a valid super seller auction. SinceM is ex-ante WBB, Eb,s[pB(b, s) −
∑
i p
S(b, s)] ≥ 0.
Thus we have
GFT(M) = E
b,s
∑
i∈[n]
xi(b, s)(bi − si)

≤ E
b,s
pB(b, s)−∑
i∈[n]
xi(b, s) · si
+ E
b,s
∑
i∈[n]
(xi(b, s) · bi − pSi (b, s))

≤ OPT-S + OPT-B
TakingM to be the GFT-maximizing mechanism completes the proof.
We next prove an analog of the “Marginal Mechanism Lemma” [9, 22] for the optimal profit. Namely,
let (T,R) be a partition of the items in [n], then the optimal profit in a super seller auction with items in [n]
is upper bounded by the first-best GFT for items in T plus the optimal profit in a super seller auction with
items in R.
Lemma 29 (Marginal Mechanism for Profit). For any subset T ∈ [n], we let F∣∣
T
= {S ⊆ T : S ∈ F}
denote the restriction of F to T . We use FB-GFT(T,F∣∣
T
) to denote the first-best GFT obtainable between
sellers in T and the F∣∣
T
-constrained additive buyer, that is,
FB-GFT(T,F∣∣
T
) = E
bT ,sT
[
max
S∈F|T
∑
i∈S
(bi − si)+
]
,
where bT = {bi}i∈T , sT = {si}i∈T . Let (R, T ) be any partition of the items in [n]. Then
OPT-S([n],F) ≤ OPT-S(R,F∣∣
R
) + FB-GFT(T,F∣∣
T
).
Proof. Consider the optimal BIC and IR mechanismM = (x, p) in the super seller auction with item set
[n]. We will construct a BIC and IR mechanismM′ = (x′, p′) in the super seller auction with item set R
as follows. The mechanism only sells items in R using the same allocation x. The payment for the buyer is
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defined as the payment p inMminus the buyer’s expected total value for all items in T . Formally, for every
bR = {bj}j∈R, sR = {sj}j∈R and i ∈ R, let
x′i(bR, sR) = EbT ,sT
[xi(b, s)]
p′(bR, sR) = E
bT ,sT
p(b, s)−∑
j∈T
bj · xj(b, s)
 .
Notice that inM′, the expected utility of the buyer with type bR when reporting b′R is
E
sR
[∑
i∈T
bi · x′i(b′R, sR)− p′(b′R, sR)
]
= E
bT ,s
∑
i∈[n]
bi · xi(b′R,bT , s)− p(b′R,bT , s)
 ,
SinceM is BIC and IR,M′ is also BIC and IR. Thus
OPT-S([n],F) = E
b,s
p(b, s)−∑
i∈[n]
si · xi(b, s)

= E
bR,sR
[
p′(bR, sR)−
∑
i∈R
si · x′i(bR, sR)
]
+ E
b,s
[∑
i∈T
(bi − si) · xi(b, s)
]
≤OPT-S(R,F∣∣
R
) + FB-GFT(T,F∣∣
T
).
We partition the items into the set of “likely to trade” items, that is, items with trade probability ri =
Prbi,si [bi ≥ si] ≥ 1/n, and the “unlikely to trade” items. We can bound the OPT-S by the first-best GFT
of the “likely to trade” items and the optimal profit of the super seller auction with the “unlikely to trade”
items. We can further replace the first-best GFT of the “likely to trade” by O(log n) · GFTCFPP according
to Theorem 1 or by O(log2(n)) · GFTCFPP according to Theorem 2 depending on the buyer’s feasibility
constraint. Formally,
Lemma 30. Define H = {i ∈ [n] : ri ≥ 1n} and L = [n]\H = {i ∈ [n] : ri < 1n}. Suppose the buyer’s
feasibility constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable for some δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Then
SB-GFT ≤ OPT-B + OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) + FB-GFT(H,F∣∣
H
)
≤ OPT-B + OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) +O
(
log n
δ · η
)
· GFTCFPP.
For general constrained-additive buyer,
SB-GFT ≤ OPT-B + OPT-S(L,F∣∣
L
) +O
(
log2(n)
) · GFTCFPP.
Proof. The first inequality follows from Lemma 28 and 29. Since F is (δ, η)-selectable, F∣∣
H
is also (δ, η)-
selectable. We derive the second inequality by applying Theorem 1 on the items in H . For a general
constrained-additive buyer, we derive the inequality by applying Theorem 2 on the items in H .
Proof of Lemma 14. It directly follows from Lemmas 30 and 20.
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E Missing Details from Section 5
Proof of Theorem 4:
We construct the following allocation rule x = {xi(b, s)}i∈[n]. For every i and b, s, let
xi(b, s) = 1 [i = argmaxk(ϕ˜k(bk)− sk) ∧ ϕ˜i(bi) ≥ si] .
Then x satisfies both properties in the statement of Lemma 17. Thus by Lemma 17,
GFTSAPP ≥ E
b,s
[∑
i
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si) · xi(b, s)
]
= E
b,s
[
max
i
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+
]
.
Moreover, we use the upper-bound on SB-GFTSD given by Brustle et al. [7],
SB-GFTSD ≤ E
b,s
[
max
i
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+
]
+ E
b,s
[
max
i
(bi − τ˜i(si))+
]
.
Thus by Lemma 15, we have
max{OPT-B,GFTSAPP} ≥ 1
2
·
(
E
b,s
[
max
i
(ϕ˜i(bi)− si)+
]
+ E
b,s
[
max
i
(bi − τ˜i(si))+
])
≥ 1
2
· SB-GFTSD ≥ 1
2c
· FB-GFTSD.
2
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